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ABSTRACT 
 
Economic Essays on Water Resources Management  
of the Texas Lower Rio Grande Valley. (May 2012) 
Andrew John Leidner, B.A., University of Georgia 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. M. Edward Rister  
        Dr. Ronald D. Lacewell 
 
The study area for this dissertation is the Texas Lower Rio Grande Valley 
(Valley). The overarching theme is water and includes regional water management, 
water management institutions, and water supply decision-making as it relates to 
community well-being and public health. 
The first essay provides a description of a control model developed for the 
management of a municipal water supply system in the context of public health and 
waterborne illnesses issues.  The most beneficial disease-management strategy is found 
to depend on the community’s levels of infected population, water services, and budget.  
The model is numerically parameterized using data drawn from Hidalgo County in the 
Valley.  Greater capital depreciation rates and shorter planning horizons contribute to 
lower levels of community well-being, which is measured as the present value of 
damages from disease infection levels.  Reductions in community well-being are greatest 
when greater capital depreciation rates are combined with shorter planning horizons. 
The second essay provides an overview of the organizations, institutions, 
policies, and geographic particulars of the region’s water management system and the 
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region’s water market.  Demand growth for potable water and a relatively-fixed supply 
of raw water are reflected in increasing prices for domestic, municipal, and industrial 
(DMI) water rights.  The market is characterized by rising prices and the transfer of 
water from lower-value to higher-value uses.  Some reasons for the market’s 
functionality are due to minimal return flows to the Rio Grande (River) occurring 
throughout the Valley, and the monitoring and enforcement efforts of the Rio Grande 
Watermaster Program.   
The final essay is a presentation of a hydroeconomic model to study regional 
allocation of water resources across the municipal and agricultural sectors of several 
counties in the Valley.  Results indicate that anticipated population growth will increase 
demand for municipal water and will motivate the transfer of water from the agricultural 
sector to the municipal sector and the further development of brackish desalination of 
groundwater.  Population density scenarios indicate greater population density is 
associated with a greater level of agricultural production and reduced revenue to 
agriculture from land and water-right sales.  On balance, climate change scenarios with 
population increases to 2060 are associated with fewer acres farmed, cropping pattern 
shifts to higher-value crops, and increasing irrigation requirements. 
Since the study area for this dissertation is encountering a variety of challenges 
that are related to environmental conditions, institutions, demographics, and health, this 
dissertation may provide guidance to the broader water-management community and to 
other locations, where these challenges are also occurring. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Texas Lower Rio Grande Valley (Valley) (Figure 1-1) poses a number of 
water resource management issues.  It is located on an international border, sharing the 
Rio Grande (River) with the Mexican state of Tamaulipas.  Due in part to the proximity 
to Mexico, immigration-fueled population growth in the Valley has resulted in rapidly-
expanding municipalities.  Relative to the rest of the United States, the growing 
municipalities of the Valley are characterized by high rates of poverty, exhibiting many 
issues encountered in international economically-developing areas.  This rapid urban 
expansion is occurring into the Valley’s longstanding, vast and vigorous agricultural 
sector, which currently owns the majority of Rio Grande surface water rights.  
Climatically extreme, portions of the Valley can be generally characterized as 
semi-arid, but due to the proximity of the Gulf of Mexico, the entire Valley can be 
periodically inundated with extreme rainfall events from tropical storm systems.  The 
unique and diverse economic, demographic, and climatic circumstances make the Valley 
a complex and worthy location for the study of water resource economics and related 
management strategies. 
   
 
______________ 
This dissertation follows the style of the American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
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Figure 1-1. Map of the State of Texas with the Lower Rio Grande Valley as the 
shaded region, 2011. 
Source(s): Google Images (2011). 
The institutional environment of the Valley is also complex.  Water resource 
management is subject to authorities at all levels of government, including for example: 
local (e.g., municipal and county governments, irrigation districts), regional (e.g., Rio 
Grande Watermaster Program), state (e.g., Texas Commission on Environmental 
Quality), national (e.g., Environmental Protection Agency), and international (e.g., 
International Boundary and Water Commission).  A water market operates across the 
region, but water rights transactions are complex and highly regulated.  The Valley is 
home to many immigrant communities, known as colonias, which are often hastily-built 
residential neighborhoods that may not have access to water services considered to be 
standard in many parts of the United States. 
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Hydrologically, the Valley has access to one major river, the Rio Grande, which 
has been extensively developed, meaning a large network of river diversion and water 
distribution infrastructure exists to serve the demands of municipal and agricultural 
interests across the Valley.  Adjudication of water rights occurred in a period of above 
average rainfall and resulted in over allocation of expected available supply (Stubbs 
et al. 2003).  During periods of drought, the Valley experiences ongoing environmental 
concerns.  In addition to relying on the River, municipal water suppliers have diversified 
their portfolio of water supply alternatives to include brackish groundwater desalination.  
Currently, municipalities in coastal Cameron County are also exploring the potential of 
seawater desalination. 
Given the characteristics outlined above, water resource management in the 
region is challenging.  In recent years, a water market has emerged as a potential 
solution to urban water scarcity through water rights reallocations from agricultural 
interests to urban and municipal interests.  The water market operating in the Valley has 
worked well to achieve some water management goals (for example agricultural-to-
municipal reallocation), but has arguably left environmental and instream demands 
unmet.  The viability and utility of modifications to the market or potential non-market 
mechanisms to increase environmental flows are ongoing issues for the Valley.  And 
finally, long-run water resource management planning in the Valley is expected to 
encounter a variety of issues ranging from environmental, to rapid increases in 
population and related water demands, to shortfalls in water supplies as a result of 
climate variability and changing structure of the region. 
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The overarching objective of this dissertation is to generate information and 
analyses along with decision-making tools that will assist Valley water resource planners 
and managers as they confront water-related issues.  Included is an evaluation of several 
facets of regional water management, with a particular focus on municipal water 
decision-making.  The dissertation is divided into three sections, with each section 
composed of a stand-alone academic paper.  The common themes occurring throughout 
the three papers include water management institutions and policy, water management 
objectives, and water service costs and benefits.  More specifically, the focus includes 
the interaction of water-supply systems and public health, in the context of water-borne 
and sanitation-related illnesses; water reallocation from agricultural use to municipal 
use, in the context of a water market; and long-term region-wide optimal water 
management for both municipal and agricultural sectors, taking into account 
demographic changes, institutional changes, and potential climate change. 
The three essays that comprise this dissertation are as follows: 
1. Drinking Water Supply System Management for Public Health; 
2. The Water Market of the Texas Lower Rio Grande Valley; and, 
3. Hydroeconomic Analysis of the Texas Lower Rio Grande Valley Water 
Supplies under Urbanization and Climate Change.   
These three papers use three different methodologies to study inter-related water 
management issues.  Essay 1 or Chapter II, “Drinking Water Supply System 
Management for Public Health,” employs optimal control techniques, and computational 
methods to model and better understand the decision-making process of municipal 
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water-suppliers and city managers in the context of health-related water and medical 
services, which affect poorer areas in Hidalgo County.  Essay 2 or Chapter III, “The 
Water Market of the Texas Lower Rio Grande Valley,” is a structural and qualitative 
performance assessment of water-market policies and agents in the Texas Lower Rio 
Grande Valley regional water management system.  Essay 3 or Chapter IV, 
“Hydroeconomic Analysis of the Texas Lower Rio Grande Valley Water Supplies under 
Urbanization and Climate Change,” includes the development of an optimization model, 
integrating hydrologic, economic, and institutional characteristics.  The hydroeconomic 
model is applied to evaluate a variety of municipal water-supply options and agricultural 
water-use, as a function of cropping choice.  The response of modeled municipal and 
agricultural agents to population growth and climate change are explored. 
Together, these three papers are designed to provide insight and analyses that can 
be used by water managers in the region as they look forward to encounter future 
challenges and opportunities.  These challenges will likely come from substantial 
population growth, which brings with it urban consumer demands, potential health 
issues, and urban land-use expansion; continued climate variability, with the variability 
potentially intensifying as climate change takes hold; competitiveness over water 
between urban and agricultural sectors, and possibly between nations as both the United 
States and Mexico continue to utilize the shared resource of the Rio Grande.  The 
consequences of these challenges will motivate solutions in the manner of technological 
and institutional innovations. 
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CHAPTER II 
DRINKING WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM MANAGEMENT  
FOR PUBLIC HEALTH 
 
2.1  Introduction 
The relationship between water supply systems and public health is explored in 
this essay.  Water-related health issues are pervasive throughout both the developed and 
the developing world.  Due to the importance of physical health and the role health plays 
in productive labor in developing impoverished regions, the relationship between water, 
health, and economic productivity is especially significant.  As of 2010, over 800 million 
individuals lacked access to “improved sources of drinking-water,” and over 2.5 billion 
lacked access to “improved sanitation” (WHO and UNICEF 2010).   For many years, 
water systems, public health, economic development, and the interactions and effects 
connecting them have been the focus of researchers from a wide variety of fields; see 
Hoddinott (1997) for a review.  As examples, diarrheal illnesses kill more than 2 million 
children annually, mostly in developing countries (Kosek et al. 2003).  And, arsenic 
contamination of groundwater wells in rural Bangladesh reduces household labor 
supplies by as much as 8% (Carson et al. 2011).   A recent willingness-to-pay study for 
the Bangladeshi arsenic issue, which evaluated decentralized and centralized water 
treatment solutions, concludes, “the arsenic problem is not merely a problem of 
technology but is as much, if not more, an issue of institutions – private and public – that 
influence the financing and delivery of safe water” (Ahmad et al. 2003).         
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The Rio Grande Valley in Texas has experienced substantial population growth 
in recent years (Leidner et al. 2011b).  This population growth has fueled the rapid 
development of quasi-urban settlements, known as colonias, which are not always 
connected to utility infrastructure which would be considered standard in most parts of 
the United States.  The struggles of the colonias to attain standard levels of water, 
wastewater, and other civil infrastructure are well documented in the research literature 
(Olmstead 2003; Perkins et al. 2001; Reed, Stowe, and Yanke, LLC 2001; U.S. Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas 1996; and Williams 2006) as well as in the popular media 
(Ramshaw 2011).  A survey completed by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) 
reported in 2007 that as many as 34,924 colonia residents (or 18% of all colonia 
residents in the Valley) in Cameron, Hidalgo, and Willacy counties did not have access 
to standard levels of either potable water or wastewater services (USGS 2010b).   
The lack of universal access to water services may contribute to health concerns 
in the area.  Suggestive evidence is reflected in the infection rates of water and 
sanitation-related diseases, which in Hidalgo county exceed the state average over 
several years (Figure 2-1).  In Table 2-1, infection levels from 1999 for Hidalgo and 
Cameron counties can be compared to average levels in Texas and the United States.  In 
particular, the high rates of hepatitis A and shigelleosis provide suggestive evidence that 
water and sanitation-related health concerns are more important in Valley counties with 
significant colonia populations. 
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Figure 2-1.  Reported infection rates of various diarrheal illnesses for Hidalgo 
County and for all of Texas from 1992 to 1999.  Reported diseases include: 
Amebiasis, Campylobacteriosis, Salmonellosis, Shigellosis.   
Source(s): USGS (2010a) and TXDHS (2007). 
Table 2-1. Infection rates (per 100,000 population) of water and sanitation 
related diseases in two Valley counties (Cameron and Hidalgo) with substantial 
colonia populations, Texas, and the U.S., 1999. 
  Hepatitis A Salmonellosis Shigellosis 
Cameron County 56.1 14.6 23.5 
Hidalgo County 38.0 20.6 19.3 
Texas 12.6 11.0 11.4 
U.S. 6.3 14.9 6.4 
Source(s): Warner and Jahnke (2003), citing TXDHS (1999) and CDC (1999). 
The influence of certain institutional and environmental circumstances on 
optimal water-supply systems and public health management are investigated herein.  
Some of the circumstances include: the public health manager’s planning horizon, the 
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size of the public health budget, and the rate of capital depreciation of water-service 
infrastructure; all of which affect public-health and water-service decision-making.  An 
overarching theme of this dissertation is to better understand and to offer suggestions for 
improving water management institutions.  Laws such as the Safe Drinking Water Act 
(1974), and, closer to the study area, recent legal efforts (Office of the Attorney General 
2011) and financial efforts (TWDB 2011) by the Texas government constitute 
institutions designed to improve living-standards, water-access, and, ultimately, public 
health of impoverished communities.   
These issues are investigated by developing a conceptual, optimal-management 
model.  A case study using data from Hidalgo County is developed to explore the 
implications of the theoretical model.  First, a description of the general model is 
presented, followed by a discussion of theoretical findings in several special cases.  
Finally, numerical results are generated and discussed for a case study of Hidalgo 
County. 
2.2  Water and Health Background 
Poor drinking water, lack of sanitation infrastructure, and medical institutions 
contribute to public health issues which can take many forms, including all varieties of 
waterborne and water-related illnesses such as cholera, dysentery, and malaria.  In the 
early 1900s, cases and mortalities of waterborne illnesses began to decline as drinking 
water chlorination and antibiotic use become more common (Morris and Levin 1995).  
But even in the present day, in the wealthiest and most technologically-advanced regions 
of the world, water-related health issues are not entirely avoidable (Yoder et al. 2008).  
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For example, in the United States, water-health issues range from arsenic-contamination 
hotspots (Jakus et al. 2009), to cancer-causing water-treatment byproducts (Adamowicz 
et al. 2011), to the absence of rudimentary water and sanitation services in certain rural 
and impoverished locations like areas of the Valley (Olmstead 2004).   
Regions of Brazil studied by Feler and Henderson (2011) exhibit similarly rooted 
urban development and water-sanitation issues as the Valley.  They find that 
municipalities are strategically manipulating their water-supply management institutions 
to manage the migration-fueled growth of quasi-urban settlements.  In the Valley, utility 
services and management of quasi-urban settlements have been a persistent issue since 
immigration levels dramatically increased in the past decades (U.S. Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas 1996).  Competing institutions’ (i.e., private versus public) provision of 
water services impacts costs as well as water service coverage in the Valley (Olmstead 
2004) and associated public health outcomes.  Private versus public institutional 
competition has been shown to have an especially important impact on child health 
(Galiani 2005). 
While many regard access to clean drinking water as a basic human right, in the 
presence of a constrained budget such a policy may not be operational.  Budgetary 
considerations for water projects and water-related investments, particularly in 
developing regions where project financing is not local, are quite common (e.g., Easter 
and Liu 2005; Iyer et al. 2005; and van den Berg and Katakura 1999).  Under a limited 
budget, the model developed here is applied to investigate the tradeoffs between the 
provision of preventative public health by way of clean drinking water and the provision 
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of therapeutic public health by way of medical treatment, ex post an infection.  In 
addition to the more general tradeoff between preventative and therapeutic public health, 
application of the model allows for consideration of the attributes of two different types 
of water services: centralized-municipal services (CM) and point-of-use services (POU).   
Of interest in this study are the economic tradeoffs between these two types of 
water services.  CM services may be more expensive in the short term, but are more 
durable through time.  POU may be less expensive in the short term, but likely requires 
more frequent replacement.  Not only do the benefits of different water service types 
vary through time, but at any given point in time the activities’ marginal effectiveness, 
or the ability for either CM or POU to prevent illness, may also vary.  For simplicity, 
assumed in this model is that both CM and POU are, on the margin, equally effective at 
preventing illness.  The more durable nature of CM suggests a dynamic resource 
allocation structure whereby CM services are conceptualized as stock resources.  In this 
setting, the longer-term net benefits of additional investments into CM stock are weighed 
against the instantaneous net benefits of nondurable POU services. 
Introduced in this paper is an optimal management framework to address public 
health with preventative water services and remedial medical treatment.  Treating a 
preventative activity (CM) as a stock variable in context of water-borne diseases is new 
contribution to the water-health literature.  This essay contributes to the literature on 
spatial-dynamic processes and renewable resource models (Smith et al. 2009) as well as 
to the literature on water-related public health issues (Galiani et al. 2005).  Diseases in a 
population can be conceptualized as a renewable resource management problem where 
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the resource of interest is the disease, which yields costs to the manager rather than 
benefits (Ceddia 2010).  While human and animal diseases have been studied using 
optimal control methods (e.g., Goldman and Lightwood 2002; Horan and Wolf 2005; 
Gersovitz and Hammer 2004), this study is one of a few that applies such methods to 
consider waterborne diseases, another being Wiemer (1987) who considers 
schistosomiasis in China.  Other disease mitigation strategies could also be modeled in a 
similar fashion, including health care infrastructure (e.g., hospital or clinical networks, 
public health, or hygiene education levels). 
2.3  Model Description 
The management model developed in this section is based on a model from the 
ecology of diseases.  The ecological model, called the susceptible-infected-susceptible 
(SIS) disease model (Hethcote 1976), represents the movement of pathogens through a 
host population.  This is a compartmental model, meaning that the host population is 
compartmentalized into either the “susceptible” class or the “infected” class.  If a 
pathogen invades a host, the host moves from the susceptible class to the infected class.  
When an infected host recovers from illness, that host is moved back into the susceptible 
class.   Many variants of disease models exist to accommodate modeling of the diverse 
array of host-pathogen systems.  The SIS model is adapted for use here by making 
population movements between the susceptible and infected classes a function of the 
intensity of the economic controls (e.g., the intensity of POU water services or medical 
treatment) that are of interest to water-service and public health managers. 
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In the context of waterborne diseases, water services primarily serve as 
preventive activities.  Optimal management of water services for public health would 
account for the tradeoff between these preventive activities and any available therapeutic 
activities, such as the treatment of the ill by medical professionals in the community.  
Modeling these therapeutic activities requires partitioning the community’s population 
into those who are susceptible (or healthy) and those who are infected (or ill).  These 
population dynamics are captured by considering a susceptible-infected-susceptible 
(SIS) disease model (Hethcote 1976).  Similar disease models have been used by 
economists in previous studies (Goldman and Lightwood 2002; Horan and Wolf 2005; 
Zaric and Brandeau 2001; and Brandeau et al. 2003).  
The model is presented in three parts, consisting of the nature of the two methods 
of water services, followed by an explanation of the disease model, modified by the 
inclusion of water services.  The final sub-section of the model presentation describes 
more thoroughly the cost structures faced by the model’s decision-making agent. 
Water Services  
Water services systems in a community can be conceptualized as being 
composed of three population classes.  One class has access to CM water services; the 
size of this class is denoted by .  The second class has access to POU water services, 
such as in-home drinking water filters and home or local septic systems, and is denoted 
.  The final class receives no water services.  With the total customer pool 
normalized to one, the size of the final class is 1 −  − .  The management 
decision considered is how large, if at all, the optimal size of each water-service 
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infrastructure class, given a fixed budget for the community’s public health-related 
services. 
Disease Dynamics 
This section contains details of the disease model and how the basic SIS model is 
augmented with controls, such as the intensity of either type of water service and the 
intensity of medical treatment.  These controls adjust the rate of movement between the 
susceptible and infected classes in the population.  The disease model used in this paper 
is the SIS model with a population size normalized to one: 
 +  =  = 1,          (2.1) 
where  is the population portion of susceptible individuals,  is the portion of 
population infected, and  is the total population level, at time 	.  The dynamics of the 
disease through the portions of the populations are represented by the derivatives of  or 
 with respect to time.  The time-derivative of the susceptible portion is as follows: 


= 
 =  +  −  −  ,  + ,    (2.2) 
where  is the population birth rate and is assumed to not be affected by the proportion 
of people who are infected.  This is a reasonable assumption for many waterborne 
diseases in human populations, i.e., most waterborne diarrheal illnesses are symptomatic 
for a relatively short period of time, those infected remain fertile and, hence, do not 
reduce an individual’s reproductive ability.  For other host organisms, such as those in 
the cattle industry, such an assumption is more tenuous.  Leptospirosis, a waterborne 
cattle disease, is linked to reproduction losses (Grooms 2006; Dhaliwal et al. 1996).   
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The rate of movement of population portions from susceptible to infected is 
determined by the transmission function, denoted as  , .  It is a function of 
the size of the water-service neighborhoods represented by  and .  In most 
cases, a reasonable assumption is that increasing levels of  and  reduces the 
population’s average transmission rate.  One hypothetical exception to this claim could 
be the case of a biological (or chemical) agent that somehow manages to employ a CM 
water distribution network as a conduit for new infections (or contaminations).  For 
specific cases, the ability for either CM or POU to reduce transmission depends on the 
particular disease as well as the particular water-service technology under consideration.   
Just as the portion of individuals in the susceptible class is reduced by 
transmissions, those who are infected and survive rejoin the susceptible class at a 
recovery rate equal to the function , where  is the level of medical treatment 
deployed to the total population.  To ensure that healthy people are not given medical 
treatments,  is constrained to be less than or equal to the size of the infected portion.   
Substituting equation 2.1 into equation 2.2, the time derivative of the susceptible 
class can be rewritten in terms of only the infected class: 
 
 = 1 −  + − 1 − −  , 1 −  + . (2.3) 
By assuming that population birth rate is equal to the natural death rate (i.e.,  =
), further simplification of the susceptible portion’s state equation is obtained: 
  =  − ,	
1 − + 
.     (2.4) 
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The  =  assumption imposes a constant population size on the modeled community.  
This assumption can be relaxed in two directions, one where  >  imposes a growing 
population and the other where  <  implies a population in decline.  
Once again, invoking equation 2.1 can yield the state equation for the infected 
class from equation 2.4: 
 
 = −
 = 	 −1 − , 1 − +  
  = − +  , 1 −  − .   (2.5) 
Equation 2.5 contains the class (or state) dynamics that are employed later in the 
setup of the optimal control problem.  Next, the transmission and recovery functions are 
more thoroughly defined to identify more explicit relationships between water services, 
medical treatment, and the dynamics of the waterborne disease through the population.  
The transmission function is as follows: 
 ,  =  +  + 	1 −  − ,  (2.6) 
where the natural, or spontaneous, transmission rate 	 of the disease only affects the 
portion of the population that receives neither CM or POU water services.  Similarly, 
 and  are the transmission rates associated with residents receiving CM and 
POU water services, respectively.  Depending on the disease under consideration, the 
values of the three transmission rates may be different or the same.  A typical case where 
CM and POU do an equally effective job of reducing transmissions (an assumption 
maintained throughout this essay) can be captured with:   =  = 
  and 

 < 	.  In this case, CM and POU water services provide the same level of disease-
prevention and, assuming 
 is quite small, the only portion of the population with 
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significant exposure to the disease are those individuals without any form of water 
services.  Furthermore, if water-service levels are sufficiently high  (i.e., 1 −  −
 is sufficiently small), then the population-wide effect of higher, natural 
transmission rates is, again, small. 
The recovery function is defined similarly as a weighted-average of a 
spontaneous and anthropogenically-altered disease-recovery parameter from the 
population dynamics of the SIS model: 
  = 	 −  + ,      (2.7) 
where  is the portion of the total population that receives medical treatment.  In this 
model, administering medical treatment, as it’s defined, to individuals who are not 
infected is not a reasonable policy.  Medical treatment only increases the recovery rate 
and does not impact the transmission (i.e., does not facilitate prevention) of illness.  The 
following constraint is imposed:  ≤ .  At full treatment of all infected individuals, 
the following holds:  = .  The two recovery coefficients are 	, the natural, or 
spontaneous, rate of recovery, and , the medically-enhanced recovery rate.   
Public Health Expenditures 
Introduced in this section are more specifics about the three disease management 
activities, starting with CM water services ().  Since CM water services have, 
relative to POU water services, dynamic properties (i.e. must be constructed, maintained 
through multiple time periods, and can depreciate), CM water services are represented in 
the model by a second state variable (the first being the infected portion of the 
18 
 
population), which expands and depreciates according to the following equation of 
motion: 
 
 = 
  − ,       (2.8) 
where  is the level of build out, with full-infrastructure at  = 1;  is a 
constant component of CM water service cost;  is a control variable, representing an 
administrator’s expenditures towards CM water services; and  is a depreciation term 
used to represent maintenance on existing infrastructure.  One of the most important 
implications for the first term in the CM water-services state equation (i.e., 
1 −  ⁄ ) is that expenditures on water supply improvements exhibit 
decreasing marginal returns.  Inverting equation 2.8 yields an expenditure, or cost, 
function: 
  = 
 +  
 
 = 
  
+   
.     (2.9) 
Expenditures to CM () are applied to either new additions 
(i.e., 
 1 − ⁄ ) or maintenance on existing infrastructure 
(i.e.,  1 − ⁄ ).  Both the new addition and the infrastructure repairs are 
weighted by a factor (i.e.,  1 − ⁄ ) that results in increasing marginal costs.  
With this specification, marginal costs increase to infinity as the level of CM water-
service approaches one.  This assumption is reasonable for cities with dense central 
populations and more sparse populations on the outskirts and rural areas, where costs to 
bring water services to the more rural residents would be increasing with their distance 
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from the city centers; and, ultimately, someone in the population will be so far from the 
city center that a CM service connection would be prohibitively expensive. 
The other two controls in this model, POU and medical treatment, are not 
represented as state variables, which assumes that POU and medical treatment cannot be 
stored across time periods.  That is, POU water services and medical treatment are 
completely non-durable, or their annual depreciation rate is set at 100%.  This 
assumption may not be appropriate for all conceivable types of POU devices or 
household water-treatment systems that are available in the water-treatment marketplace.  
But in most cases, POU and/or household treatment water systems are less durable than 
CM water system infrastructure.   
The expenditure specifications for POU water services and medical treatment 
(with 100% annual depreciation rates) are defined as follows: 
  = , and       (2.10) 
 = ,          (2.11) 
where  and  are, respectively, the expenditures towards medical treatment of the 
infected individuals and the expenditures towards POU water service;  and  are 
constant unit-costs; and , which was introduced earlier, is the portion of the total 
population receiving medical treatment and is constrained to be less than the proportion 
of infected individuals.   
For this to be a reasonable method to depict the cost of a medical treatment, the 
total population must remain constant.  A constant total population is assumed when the 
natural birth and natural death rates are set to be equal.  The assumption of constant 
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population is also maintained by the model’s omission of disease-induced deaths, or 
virulence, from consideration.  The relaxation of the constant population assumption, in 
particular, allowing for a growing population is one avenue for future model expansion.   
The assumption of negligible virulence, in the context of most developing 
regions, would not be reasonable.  Diarrhea causes an estimated 1.5 million deaths in 
children under the age of five every year (Wardlaw et al. 2009).  But in the context of a 
highly-developed region, where childhood malnutrition is less severe and where health 
care institutions are more well-established, a death by waterborne disease is considerably 
less likely.  In the U.S. between 1971 and 2002, there were only 79 recorded deaths from 
waterborne disease outbreaks associated with drinking water (Reynolds et al. 2008) as 
compared with millions of deaths worldwide primarily from the countries of Africa and 
southeast Asia (WHO 2007).  A more general model that can accommodate the 
possibility of virulence is another avenue for future research. 
In contrast to the increasing marginal costs of CM water services (equation 2.9), 
the marginal costs of providing POU water services (equation 2.10) and medical 
treatment (equation 2.11) are constant across the community.  This is a simplifying 
assumption but provides reasonable outcomes.  An argument can be made that either 
POU or medical services could more accurately be portrayed as a dynamic, stock 
resource.  Cultural familiarity with POU technology and the efficiency of health care 
institutions can both potentially increase over time.  For computational tractability, 
because additional state variables impose onto models the “curse of dimensionality” 
(Rust 1997; Woodward, Wui, and Griffin 2005), and because CM water services are 
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considered most appropriate (i.e. more so than the other two), CM is the only disease 
management strategy to be portrayed with a state variable for the current scope of this 
study. 
2.4 Public Health Manager’s Decision 
The decision issue formulated by this model does not precisely correspond to the 
social planner’s decision issues as traditionally considered by resource and welfare 
economists, i.e., including those studied by Goldman and Lightwood (2002) or Gersovitz 
and Hammer (2004).  The agent’s decision issue described here may more closely 
resemble that of a public choice agent in the context of public health management.  The 
deviation from the traditional social planner’s decision issues is mainly due to two 
reasons.  First, the social planner’s problems consider a more holistic view of social 
welfare (i.e., inclusive of disease damages as well as income levels and management 
costs), whereas the objective function here only includes disease damages.  Secondly, 
social planner’s decision issues usually are optimized over an infinite time horizon.  
Here, the time horizon is chosen to bear a closer resemblance to the management 
decision time-frame likely to be faced by public health and economic development 
administrators who are appointed, elected, or possess funding for only a limited time.  
Therefore, the problem is identified as a public health manager’s decision with the 
objective to minimize the damages from waterborne disease over a defined time period 
subject to a fixed annual budget and the population dynamics of the disease.  The 
damage function could assume a variety of specifications; a simple, linear specification 
is chosen here: 
22 
 
  = ,         (2.12) 
where the damage from the disease called the morbidity damage ();  is the per-unit 
costs of contracting a disease, which is normalized to one.  The final equation included 
in the model is a budget constraint on expenditures, ensuring that the public-health 
manager spends exactly the full budget: 
  +  +  = ,       (2.13) 
where  is the exogenous level of total expenditure.  The administrator is tasked with 
optimally dividing up funds equal to  towards the goal of minimizing the damages 
caused by waterborne disease.  The value of , essentially the size of an administrator’s 
budget determined by either a higher-ranking administrator, a local budget board, or 
some legislative action, can conceivably vary across time periods and can conceivably 
be considered a stock in the case of some management regimes.  For this essay, the issue 
of fluctuating or storable levels of  is not addressed; hence,  is considered as a 
constant through time.  Mathematically, the problem of the administrator is: 
 max  −1	 	,       (2.14) 
Subject to: 
 =  − +  +  + 1 −  − 	 
1 −  
 −

 − + ,      (2.15) 
  =
	



 − ,       (2.16) 
  = ,         (2.17) 
  = ,        (2.18) 
  +  +  = ,        (2.19) 
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  ≤ ,         (2.20) 
  ≤ 1 − , and        (2.21) 
  , ,  ≥ 0.        (2.22) 
The objective function and many of the constraints have been discussed 
previously.  Two additional constraints that require further explanation are equations 
2.20 and 2.21.  Equation 2.20, if binding, suggests medical services are distributed to the 
entire infected portion of the population.  Equation 2.21, if binding, suggests water 
services, which can be either CM or POU, are distributed to the entire population, both 
susceptible and infected.  Each of these constraints imposes two important conditions on 
the public health manager’s decision issue for the context of many waterborne illnesses.  
Many cases could be made where such assumptions are reasonably relaxed.  Wealthy 
households that already have access to CM water services may choose to further 
augment the quality of their household water supply with a POU system that serves to 
enhance drinking water aesthetics as well as to provide an additional barrier against the 
transmission of disease.  Chemical and biological contaminants are reduced to a target 
level by a municipal water provider per specific standards set out by the Safe Drinking 
Water Act (1974).  Specific cases may exist where some of these contaminant levels 
(e.g, arsenic contamination) can be further reduced by POU devices, thereby giving an 
incentive and reasonable justification for households to adopt both CM and POU 
services. 
The model assumes there is no terminal value on either stock variable, proportion 
infected, or CM infrastructure.  Arguably, a negative value on the stock of those infected 
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and a positive value on the stock of CM would be reasonable assumptions.  One 
expected result from a positive salvage value being placed on terminal CM stock would 
be to motivate CM investments in later periods compared to results of the model 
application.  Additional modeling considerations are left as avenues for future research. 
Hamiltonian and First Order Conditions 
Developed in this section is a Hamiltonian for the health manager’s decision 
(equations 2.14-22).  From the Hamiltonian, a set of first-order conditions are generated, 
and the economic implications of several of the first-order conditions are discussed.  By 
first substituting constraints 2.17 and 2.18 directly into the budget constraint (equation 
2.19), the problem is shortened, but qualitatively unchanged, and yields the following 
Hamiltonian: 
   ≡ −1        
+ − +  +  + 	1 −  −  1 −    
 −	 − +  
 + 
  −  
 +  −  −  −  
 +  −  
 + 1 −  − .       (2.23) 
The following first-order conditions are generated from this Hamiltonian: 
 


 ≡  
 −   = 0,       (2.24) 
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


 ≡  − 	1 − −   −   = 0,    (2.25) 


 ≡ 	 − −   −   = 0,      (2.26) 


 ≡  − 	1 − +   − −   = r − 
,  (2.27) 
 


≡ −1 
 + − −  +  + 	1 −  − − 	 
 +  = r − 
 ,       (2.28) 
 


 ≡  −  −  −  = 0,     (2.29) 
 


 ≡  −  = 0, and       (2.30) 



 ≡ 1 −  −  = 0.      (2.31) 
Some basic insights can be gained from an interpretation of this set of first-order 
conditions.  Rearranging equation 2.24 generates: 
  =   
,        (2.32) 
where, in optimality, the marginal value to the objective function of another unit of 
water supply infrastructure (), or the shadow price of water infrastructure, is equal to 
the shadow price of the budget constraint ( ) weighted by the marginal cost of an 
additional unit of CM water infrastructure (i.e.,  1 − ⁄ ).  That is, the optimality 
rule of equating marginal benefits and costs holds.  Similar results are found for POU 
services: 
  − 	1 −  =   +  ,    (2.33) 
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where the shadow value of an additional infected individual (i.e,  ) multiplied by the 
difference in a susceptible individual’s infection rate with POU services (i.e.,  −
	1 − ) is equal to the shadow price of the budget share multiplied by the unit cost 
of another unit of POU (i.e.,  ) plus the shadow price of switching an individual 
from receiving no water service to receiving either CM or POU services (i.e.,  ).  
More intuitively, when considering to deploy a unit of POU to a household, the public 
health manager must consider ability of the POU device to reduce infections (i.e., 
 − 	1 − ) and the value of a marginal reduction in infections (i.e.,  ).  
Together, those values are weighed against the marginal value of the budget change (i.e., 
 ), which can be thought of as the POU opportunity costs, i.e., funds spent on 
POU can no longer be spent on CM or medical services. 
Similarly, for medical intervention, the first-order conditions present a 
comparison of marginal benefits and costs: 
 	 −  =   +  ,      (2.34) 
where the shadow value of an additional infected individual (i.e.,  ) multiplied by the 
difference in that infected individual’s recovery rate with medical intervention (i.e., 
	 − ) is equal to the shadow price of the budget share multiplied by the unit cost 
of another individual’s medical intervention (i.e.,  ) plus the shadow price of 
providing medical intervention to only infected individuals (i.e.,  ).  Here, as with CM 
and POU water services, the rule of setting marginal costs equal to marginal benefits 
holds. 
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Switching Points 
In the previous section, marginal benefits and marginal costs of system controls 
are discussed in the context of individual controls in isolation from the other controls.  
This section takes that concept one step further and discusses the comparison of 
marginal net benefits across two or more controls.  Controls are selected into the optimal 
management regime based on their relative marginal net contribution to the Hamiltonian.  
When two controls have equal marginal net benefits, the manager is indifferent as to the 
use of either control.  In the event that two controls do not have equal marginal net 
benefits, the control with the greatest marginal net benefit is implemented first, with the 
intensity of that activity limited by either the budget constraint or another system 
constraint.  As examples, some of the other constraints that could be binding are that 
only infected individuals can be treated with medical care (equation 2.20); water-service 
coverage cannot be redundant (i.e., households cannot have both CM and POU provided 
by a utility); and water-service coverage cannot exceed the total population (equation 
2.21).  If a system constraint is binding and the budget constraint is not, then any 
remaining funds in the budget are applied to the management activity with the next 
greatest marginal net benefit.   
The term “switching point” refers to the condition of equal marginal net benefits, 
where on either side of the switching point a different management strategy is preferred 
(i.e., switching point implies the marginal net benefit curves cross each other, and are 
not simply tangent).  Therefore, upon crossing a switching point, the preferred policy 
switches from one strategy to another. 
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Case 1: POU and Medical Allowed, CM Not Allowed (i.e.,  =  = 0, ∀		) 
This section includes a discussion of several special cases of the more general 
model described above.  Starting with the simplest of such cases, consider if CM water 
services are not feasible (i.e.,  = 0, ∀		) due to a region’s absence of CM know-how 
or the absence of materials.  This reduces the public health manager’s decision to a 
choice between two abatement activities, POU or medical treatment.  In optimality, the 
marginal net benefits of these two activities can be equated as follows: 
!" = !", or 
  − 1 −  −   −   
 = 	 −  −   −  .     (2.35) 
For this case, the marginal net benefits are simply the Hamiltonian first-order 
conditions (equations 2.25 and 2.26).  The Hamiltonian is linear with respect to these 
two particular controls, which yields a solution whereby the management activity with 
the greatest marginal net benefit at any given time is implemented to the fullest extent 
allowed by the system constraints. Assuming that funding levels are insufficient to 
deploy either POU or medical activities at maximum capacity (i.e.  ⁄ ≤ and 
 ⁄ ≤ 1), the following condition exists in optimality for every point in time: 
 If  


 =

	  





	!!

 #>	=	
<
$1,  
  then 
%&
'
&( 
∗
=  ⁄ , ∗ = 0							POU	preferred	
 =  + 								Indifferent
∗ = 0, ∗ =  ⁄ 													Medical	prefered
. (2.36) 
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The results described in equation 2.36 imply that the activity yielding the greatest 
marginal net benefit is deployed until the budget is exhausted.  If the budget constraint is 
relaxed (by supposing that the budget is sufficient to deploy all of the most preferred 
activity with some amount left over), then the amount left over can be applied to 
deployment of the 2nd most preferred activity.  For a graphical description, consider the 
numerical example illustrated in Figure 2-2.  In the region to the left of ) (Figure 2-2), 
POU is the preferred activity.  Since the x-axis represents the infected portion of the 
community, this is the same region where infection levels are lowest.  The intuitive 
reasoning for this characteristic is that a community with lower infected and higher 
susceptible portions of the population benefits the most from preventing the larger 
portion of susceptibles from contracting an illness. 
Additionally, notice the benefits of POU decrease as infected populations 
increase (i.e., as one moves rightward along the x-axis).  Intuitively, this makes sense 
given that POU is a preventive activity.  The additional value of prevention is lower at 
higher levels of infection because there are fewer susceptible individuals to gain benefit 
from prevention, and those currently infected gain nothing from further prevention 
efforts in the short term.   
For Figure 2-2, the !" curve is assumed to be positive and constant, but in 
reality, this may not be the case.  Suppose the difference between the spontaneous and 
the medically-enhanced recovery rates are minimal, or non-existent (i.e., 	 −  = 	0). 
This situation explains the policy of industrialized regions providing universal water 
services.  In these regions, individuals who become ill generally take autonomous 
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Figure 2-2.  Marginal net benefit curves (MNB) and switching point (s) for 
waterborne disease management system with two abatement activities, point-of-use 
(MNBPOU) water services (equation 2.25) and medical services (MNBm) (equation 
2.26).   
Note: This illustration uses the following parameter values:  = −100,  = 0.01, 	 = 0.2,   = 1,  = 3,  = 6,   = 1, 	 = 0.5, and  = 1.0. 
measures, i.e., they are wealthy enough to take a day off of work to recover.  Due to 
these individuals’ self-imposed convalescence, the medically-enhanced recovery rate 
stemming from social policies to medicate ill individuals does not greatly improve from 
the “spontaneous” recovery rate.  Therefore, the marginal net benefits of medical 
coverage that specifically targets common waterborne illnesses is small and, if costs are 
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sufficiently large, may be negative.  In either case, whether they are negative or positive, 
as portrayed in Figure 2-2, the marginal net benefits of medical treatment may be greater 
than, equal, or less than the marginal net benefits incurred by prevention, depending on 
the community’s portion of infected. 
Considering a different scenario, the case could be that all points along the 
!" curve are negative.  This might occur as a result of  being sufficiently 
large.  This scenario describes many, if not most, incidences of waterborne illness that 
are incurred during recreation at a natural water body.  Certainly, the technological 
knowledge and ability exists to sufficiently treat water in natural systems to prevent 
these infections, but doing so is simply, prohibitively costly.  The implication is that 
society has revealed its preference to endure a limited number of infections and treats 
those individuals that get infected with medical attention.  Or, borrowing from the case 
described in the previous paragraph, those infected individuals are wealthy enough to 
recover on their own. 
The point at which !" exceeds !" indicates the most beneficial 
disease management activity switches from POU to medical.  This point is denoted by ).  
In the aforementioned examples discussed, the exact location of the switching point (i.e., 
the values associated with !" and !") can vary greatly across applications, 
depending on the community being considered, the water source (or sources), and any of 
the large array of institutional, cultural, and economic factors that contribute to 
waterborne illness transmission and the coverage of medical and water-service systems. 
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To serve as an intuitive example, one might consider the relative locations of the 
marginal net benefit curves for a more specific region or health issue, like those 
encountered in the Valley.  In 1999, two Valley counties with significant populations of 
colonia residents reported notably higher rates of infection from sanitation and water-
related diseases than found in the rest of Texas and the U.S. (Table 2-1).   
Warner and Jahnke (2003) suggest that higher incidences of some of these 
diseases could be driven by sanitation conditions in the colonias.  Assuming that greater 
infection rates in Cameron County are driven by colonia residents, then the infection 
rates across only the county’s colonia residents would be greater still than the rate across 
all of Cameron County.  From the model, greater levels of infected implies that public 
health managers at the colonia-level accounting stance (i.e., from their specific 
institutional perspective) perceive a community in which medical treatment is more 
valuable than preventative water-service activities.  
Case 2: All Activities (CM, POU, and Medical) Allowed 
CM water services and POU water services confer the same types of benefits into 
the system; that is, both types of services reduce population transmission rates by factors 
of their associated transmission rates, respectively,  and .  As before, the 
optimality condition of equal marginal net benefits applies, with the !" coming 
from the first-order conditions equation 2.24: 
!" =  
 −    .      (2.37) 
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The marginal net benefits of CM expenditures are more complex than the other 
two activities because the benefits of additional spending depend on the stock-level of 
CM infrastructure.  Consider Figure 2-3 for a graphical interpretation. 
 
Figure 2-3. Marginal net benefit curves (MNB) and switching points (s1, s2) for 
disease management systems with three management activities, centralized-
municipal water services (MNBxCM) (equation 2.24), point-of-use water services 
(MNBPOU) (equation 2.25), and medical services (MNBM) (equation 2.26).   
Note: This illustration uses the following parameter values:  = −100,  = 0.01, 	 = 0.2,   = 1,  = 3,  = 4,   = 1, 	 = 0.5,  = 1.0, * = 0.0,  = −100,  = 4. 
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Notice in Figure 2-3 at CM levels to the left of s
, where CM levels are low, the 
marginal net benefits of CM investment (the solid line) exceed the other two disease 
management strategies.  With additional investment to increase the stock of CM 
infrastructure (i.e., moving rightward along the x-axis) the marginal net benefit of 
additional CM investments declines.  Intuitively, this makes sense in the context of a 
centrally-populated community, where to extend CM water services to the outskirts of 
the community (which could extend into vast and remote locations) becomes 
increasingly expensive to both deliver services initially and maintain those investments 
through time.  Eventually, the value of CM expansion falls.  Then, precisely at s
, the 
most socially-beneficial activity becomes the purchase and distribution of POU water 
services.   
Infected levels are held constant in Figure 2-3.  Across the entire range of CM 
infrastructure levels, the marginal net benefits of POU (dotted line) exceed the marginal 
net benefits of medical treatment (dashed line).  The dominance of POU over medical 
treatment in this example implies that the infected levels are sufficiently low; recall 
Figure 2-2, where locations to the left of ) are associated with higher marginal net 
benefits of POU. 
As another more practical example, consider that across colonia residents in half 
of rural households and a fifth of urban households there is incomplete plumbing 
(Warner and Jahnke 2003).  In such an environment, a public health manager with a 
colonia-level accounting stance perceives a public health situation that is relatively lower 
in CM (or arguably POU) water services than the situation perceived by a public health 
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manager with a city-wide or county-level accounting stance.  A county-level public 
health manager observes a public health environment with a higher level of CM stock, 
and, therefore, may prefer to use medical or POU services in lieu of expanding the CM 
at a marginally increasing cost. 
2.5  Numerical Results 
A discrete version of the model (Appendix A) is implemented to generate 
numerical results.  The model is parameterized using information from Hidalgo County, 
Texas (Appendix B) and solved using an evolutionary computation algorithm 
(Appendix C).  This section presents an example application of the model, rather than 
representing a literal policy recommendation.   
The particular context under consideration in the numerical example abstracts 
away from several important water-related disease aspects.  The numerical application 
assumes disease transmission path occurs through the ingestion of contaminated 
drinking water.  An argument can be made that disease transmissions also occur as a 
result of a combination of insufficient wastewater and sanitation systems and poor 
hygiene.  In the context of household water use, POU systems and CM systems may not 
provide equivalent protection from disease.  In particular, water used for household 
hygienic purposes may be treated if the household is apart of a CM system and may not 
be treated if the household depends on a POU system.  In addition to simplifying the 
dynamics of disease transmission, the model is based on a single public health decision-
maker for the Hidalgo County case study.  Such an administrative position does not exist 
in Hidalgo County.  Public health management for the county is a product of a variety of 
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agencies and groups at many levels of administration, i.e., state, county, city, and 
colonia.  These realities, and many others, are not explicitly considered in the remainder 
of this essay and remain avenues for future research and for greater refinement of the 
model. 
Baseline Results 
The baseline scenario evaluated numerically employs a planning horizon of six 
years.  Such a planning horizon can be considered too short or too long, depending on 
the authority and the discipline that is considering the length of a water-health program.  
Many economic development projects, including those designed to enhance water and 
sanitation services, have relatively short planning horizons, perhaps three years or less.  
Water-supply planning, especially at the regional level, typically considers a longer 
planning horizon. In the context of climate change, such a planning horizon can equal 
and exceed half a century.  For this paper, six years provides a time frame of sufficient 
length to explore implications of model applications.  Later sections investigate the 
effect of shortening the time horizon from six years to two.  Such a comparison may be 
useful in the context of local, short-term political offices, such as a mayor, city council, 
or county commissioners’ court. 
Table 2-2 contains the results from the optimization of the baseline scenario 
based on Hidalgo county parameters with starting values for the state variables coming 
from estimated levels of infected population and CM water coverage (Appendix B).  In 
model year one, the budget share is optimally divided between POU and medical 
activities, with 0.31 going to POU and 0.69 going to medical.  This means both POU and 
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medical-services activities have greater marginal net benefit than centralized-municipal 
services at that point in time in the program since no investment is made in CM.  Of 
POU and medical, POU has the greater marginal net benefit.  This is known because the 
water-services constraint is binding (the portion receiving “none” water services is zero), 
whereas the medical-services constraint is not (the portion of infected receiving medical 
treatment is 0.58).  In more practical terms, a binding water-services constraint means 
Table 2-2.   Optimization results for the baseline model in the context of water 
and health management for Hidalgo County, Texas. 
Parameter/Variable 
description Model notation 
Reference 
Equations             
Time  (year)  1 2 3 4 5 6 
         
Budget shares               
Centralized-
municipal / 2.8, 2.9, 2.13 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Point-of-use 


/ 2.6, 2.10, 2.13 0.31 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Medical / 2.7, 2.11, 2.13 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
         
Water Services               
Centralized-
municipal  2.8, 2.9 0.96 0.86 0.78 0.81 0.82 0.74 
Point-of-use 

 2.6, 2.10 0.04 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.13 
None 1 −  − 

 2.6 0.00 0.01 0.22 0.19 0.05 0.13 
         
Medical Services               
Infected portion of 
total population   
2.1, 2.5, 2.7, 
2.12 0.15 0.09 0.10 0.17 0.16 0.12 
Medically-treated 
portion of total 
population  2.7, 2.11 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Medically-treated 
portion of infected /  2.7 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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that POU devices are distributed to every individual in the community who does not 
already have CM, so that universal water services are achieved; that is, every individual 
(or household) has either POU or CM.  
 Expenditures on medical treatment for year one, being the second most preferred 
strategy, are in the amount of the budget less the expenditures already made on POU.  
Expenditures on CM are zero, indicating that the marginal net benefit of that strategy in 
model year one is lower than for the other two strategies.   An alternative presentation of 
selected data from Table 2-2 is illustrated in Figures 2-4 and 2-5, where budget shares 
and water-service coverage levels are presented graphically.In model year two and for 
the rest of the years in the baseline scenario, water services are estimated to be more 
beneficial than medical treatment.  Considering Figure 2-5, the influence of capital 
depreciation is evident.  The brick-patterned bar representing stock levels of CM follows 
a downward trend when considering the entire six year planning horizon.  The large re-
investment in CM in years three and four (Figure 2-4) is reflected in the temporarily 
increasing levels of CM stock, portrayed across years three, four, and five (Figure 2-5).  
The CM investments in the middle years are triggered by the declining CM stock levels 
in the early years.  One assumption of the analysis is that as CM stock declines, 
investments in CM become marginally less expensive.  Therefore, once CM stock 
declined through years one and two, CM investments became more desirable because the 
marginal net benefits increased per dollar investment. Recalling Figure 2-3, the CM 
investment is triggered by leftward movement along the x-axis (declining levels of CM) 
until a switch point is crossed.  CM investment activities cease altogether in years five 
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and six because the decision-maker assumes the community receives no value from CM 
stock beyond the planning horizon of six years.   
 
Figure 2-4.   Budget shares in the baseline model of three disease management 
strategies, medical treatment (MED), point of use water systems (POU), and 
centralized municipal water systems (CM). 
 
Figure 2-5.  Water service coverage levels representing no water service (None), 
point of use systems (POU), and centralized municipal systems (CM) in the baseline 
model. 
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Conceptually, two dynamic forces are at work that dictate investments in CM 
stock.  One force is the depreciation of CM capital stock, which results in investment (or 
re-investment or maintenance efforts) incur greater marginal net benefits to the 
community.  The other force is the impending end of time for the modeled decision-
maker, who gains nothing from CM’s durability once time in the model ends. The 
former force induces CM expenditures in model years three and four, and the latter force 
reduces (to zero) CM expenditures in model years five and six.  This suggests that a 
longer planning period could favor CM expenditures in years five and six. 
The absence of medical care in model years two through six can be explained by 
diarrheal illnesses being relatively common and pervasive, and frequently mild cases are 
not addressed with medical care.  Moreover, the model abstracts away from disease 
virulence.  If disease virulence were allowed to occur in the model, then the social cost 
of an infection-induced death would likely increase the marginal net benefits of medical 
care activities.  Medical care, by increasing the infected group’s rate of recovery, would 
thereby reduce the occurrence of disease-induced deaths.  But in this essay, the analysis 
is targeted towards the Valley and Valley colonias which, while impoverished relative to 
the rest of Texas and the U.S., do not have the problems of child and infant mortality due 
to waterborne illnesses that exist in the more severely impoverished parts of the globe. 
Figure 2-6 contains an alternative portrayal of the baseline model results where 
POU investments are plotted through time in CM stock space.  In model year one, the 
implementation of POU is restricted by the water-services constraint (i.e., the point t=1 
is located on the water service size constraint).  In model year two, POU implementation  
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Figure 2-6. Optimal control path for point-of-use (+#$%&) with institutional 
constraints at different levels of central-municipal infrastructure (,#'() using 
baseline values of a public health manager's problem for Hidalgo County, Texas. 
is constrained by the budget as there are insufficient funds to provide the entire 
population with water services, and population portion of size 0.01 goes without water 
services (Table 2-2).  In model year three and four, no POU is implemented.  Public 
health expenditures in these periods are characterized by full investment of available 
funds into CM stock, as shown by the rightward movement of the control path between 
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years three and four, and four and five.  In the final two model years, once again, POU is 
the most beneficial management activity and is constrained only by the size of the 
manager's budget. 
Varying the Manager’s Budget 
One expected result from varying the size of the manager’s budget (i.e., ) is 
that damages from the illness fall as expenditures on illness mitigation increase.  This is 
demonstrated to be the case in these sensitivity runs, the full results of which are 
included as Appendix D.  The most interesting result in this permutation of the model is 
the changes in the temporal-distribution of CM investments. 
Budget Set at 50% of the Baseline.  Consider Figures 2-7 and 2-8 which 
represent budget shares and water-service coverage where the budget size is reduced to 
50% of the baseline.  Relative to the baseline CM investments, in this scenario, CM 
budget shares are occurring sooner and consume the entirety of the manager’s budget for 
three years instead of two.  In the baseline case, the manager has sufficient funds to build 
CM levels to “acceptable” levels starting in years three and four.  With a reduced budget, 
the manager has incentive to more immediately restore CM, and obtain the benefits of its 
durability sooner rather than later.  CM investments in year one are zero because in year 
one the CM stock is sufficiently high (i.e., marginally increasing costs so high) that the 
marginal net benefit to additional CM is lower than the other two activities.  Ultimately, 
beginning in years five and six, the end of time for the manager dominates the 
management choice and POU expenditures comprise the full budget. 
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Figure 2-7. Budget shares in the model of three disease management strategies, 
medical treatment (MED), point of use water systems (POU), and centralized 
municipal water systems (CM), with the budget size reduced to 50% of the baseline. 
The water service coverage representation (Figure 2-8) displays the results of the 
manager’s expenditure decisions.  Most notably, notice the depreciation of CM between 
years one and two and years five and six are more rapid than between years two, three, 
and four, when the budget shares for CM investment are 100%.  Comparing the final 
level of water services for 50% reduction in budget to the baseline (Figure 2-5), it is 
clear that the smaller budget has resulted in a modeled community that, at the end of the 
time horizon, has less CM infrastructure.  Specifically, the low budget scenario ends 
with 68% of the population having CM water service, whereas the baseline scenario 
ends with 74%. 
Budget Set at 200% of the Baseline.  As might be anticipated when the budget 
size doubles, the community’s well being improves.  This is reflected in cumulative  
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Figure 2-8. Water service coverage levels representing no water service (None), 
point of use systems (POU), and centralized municipal systems (CM) in the baseline 
model, with the budget size reduced to 50% of the baseline. 
damage levels, respectively 0.54 for the wealthier scenario and 0.68 for the baseline 
scenario (Table 2-2).  Also in the increased budget scenario, the CM investments take on 
a much different distribution through time than in the baseline scenario (comparing 
Figure 2-9 to Figure 2-4), and complete water service coverage (via either CM or POU 
service) is maintained throughout all six years (Figure 2-10).  In terms of budget shares, 
rather than having two or three years where CM investments comprise the entirety of the 
manager’s budget, as was the case in the two previously discussed cases, the manager 
with the larger budget manager invests in CM in five of six time periods with 
investments slightly exceeding 50% of the total budget in just one year.  The end of time 
influence on the manager is more evident, visually, in the wealthier scenario’s budget  
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Figure 2-9. Budget shares in the model of three disease management strategies, 
medical treatment (MED), point of use water systems (POU), and centralized 
municipal water systems (CM) in a sensitivity scenario with the budget size 
increased to 200% of the baseline. 
 
Figure 2-10. Water service coverage levels representing no water service (None), 
point of use systems (POU), and centralized municipal systems (CM) in a sensitivity 
scenario with the budget size increased to 200% of the baseline. 
shares.  In Figure 2-9, CM investment peaks in the second year and then investment 
levels consistently decline every year thereafter, equaling zero in the final year.   
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Varying the Capital Depreciation Rate 
Reported in this section is the effect of capital depreciation rate.  By assumption, 
a higher capital depreciation rate results in lower levels of CM infrastructure.  The 
reduction in CM stock cannot be overcome by additional CM investments or 
expenditures in other management activities, and thereby results in higher levels of the 
portion of infected population persisting through time.  Notice in Figure 2-11 that the 
endpoint (i.e. 	 = 6) of the scenario with the lowest depreciation rate (program A in 
Figure 2-11) is located at the furthest north and west of the other endpoints (i.e., 
endpoint of B at 	 = 6 and endpoint of C at 	 = 6).  Because capital depreciation rates in 
scenario A are relatively low compared to B and C, the CM stock is more durable, 
extending the time that initial CM users can benefit from lower disease transmission 
rates.  On the other end of the spectrum, the endpoint of the program with the greatest 
capital depreciation rate (C, 	 = 6) is located furthest south and east in the Figure 2-11, 
indicating that the program is associated with higher disease prevalence and lower CM 
stock in the final model year. 
Varying the Planning Horizon 
Another important factor impacting the solution is the planning horizon for the 
public health manager.  For this scenario, the time horizon is varied exogenously. Many 
development and research related public health projects carry different requirements to 
funding entities and government bodies.  Some of the requirements may explicitly or 
implicitly limit the planning horizon (or extend, in very rare instances) for a given public 
health manager.  To investigate the effect that a difference in planning 
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Figure 2- 11.  Optimal state-paths for the two stock variables, CM water services 
and infected population levels, as the capital depreciation rate (A:  = -.-.; B:  = -.-/; C:  = -..-) is varied in the context of a public health manager's 
problem for Hidalgo County, Texas. 
horizons may have on the measured public health outcome, the model is solved using 
two different planning horizons, the baseline of six years and a shorter planning horizon 
of two years. 
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Figure 2-12.  Proportional changes in cumulative damages to a community from 
infections of a waterborne disease as the capital depreciation rate () of central-
municipal (CM) infrastructure is varied (A:  = -.-.; B:  = -.-/; C:  = -..-) 
in the context of a public health manager's problem for Hidalgo County, Texas. 
While the ending points of each program may provide suggestive evidence that 
scenarios with greater capital depreciation rates leave the community less well off, more 
conclusive evidence is found by examining the cumulative damages of each scenario.   
This evidence is depicted in Figure 2-12.  The greatest cumulative damages over the 6-
year program are found in the scenario with the most rapid depreciation of CM capital 
stock, the dotted-line representing scenario C. 
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To reasonably compare results from two scenarios with different planning 
horizons, the scenario with the shorter time horizon is solved in a sequence, recursively, 
utilizing outputs from the first run as inputs for the second run, and so on.  More 
explicitly, for the scenario with a two-year planning horizon, results are generated 
solving the model for two years.  Using the final levels of the state variables (CM stock 
and portion of infected) from the first iteration as starting values in a subsequent 
iteration, the model is solved again.  The final state levels from the second iteration are 
again used as inputs into a third iteration.  Combining the results from all three 
iterations, each of which was two years, a composite six-year result is compared with the 
baseline scenario which employs a six-year planning horizon as discussed previously.  
One of the more clearly illustrated differences between the two planning horizon 
scenarios is the difference in CM infrastructure stock accumulation over time.  In 
particular, the CM stock in the two-year program precipitously descends from the 
starting value of 0.96 to the relatively lower level of 0.74.  In the six-year scenario, 
reinvestment in CM infrastructure during periods three and four slows the decline of CM 
stock.  Also, as illustrated in Figure 2-13, the relative locations of the end points for the 
two planning horizons suggests that the six-year program is preferred, due to its location 
further to the north and west, where CM levels are high and infection levels are low.  
This suggestion is confirmed by examining Figure 2-14, which displays the cumulative 
damages of both programs, and, indeed, the cumulative damages of the two-year 
program, while equal or lower than the 6-year program in five of six years, exceeds the 
six year program in the final year of the comparison. 
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Figure 2-13.  Optimal state-paths for the two stock variables, CM water services 
and infected population levels, as the planning horizon varies (A: 0 = 1; B: 0 = 2) 
is varied in the context of a public health manager's planning horizon for Hidalgo 
County, Texas. 
The difference in cumulative damages across the two scenarios is an example of 
the impact and the relevance that institutional design can have on social goals, such as 
public health.  Public administrators elected or appointed to shorter-term offices are 
incentivized to manage for the short-run.  The outcome displayed in Figure 2-14 
demonstrates that the modeled public health program is managed better when the 
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Figure 2-14.   Proportional change in cumulative damages of two scenarios, as the 
planning horizon varies (A: 0 = 1; B: 0 = 2) in the context of a public health 
manager's problem for Hidalgo County, Texas. 
planning time horizon is longer, given the parameters used in this model and focusing on 
the end point (i.e., cumulated damages at  = 6).   
Varying the Depreciation Rate and the Panning Horizon 
The objective of this section is to examine the influence of depreciation rate and 
planning horizon when they are varied together.  In other words, does the planning 
horizon become more important or less important for the objective of minimizing 
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community damage as the capital depreciation rate increases/decreases?  The results are 
summarized in Table 2-3.  With a planning horizon of two years, increasing the capital 
depreciation rate from 0.05 to 0.10 increases the total damages to the community by 0.20 
(or 20%); as compared to increasing the capital depreciation rate from 0.05 to 0.10 with 
a six year program, the total damages to the community increase by 0.16 (or 16%).   
A clear conclusion is that lower capital depreciation and longer planning 
horizons improve public health management outcomes.  The far right column of 
Table 2-3 indicates that an increasing capital depreciation rate results in less desirable 
outcomes.  The influence of capital depreciation seems considerably stronger than the 
influence of time horizon, but this may be a consequence of the parameter values 
selected for analysis.  Over a smaller range of capital depreciation rates, it is perceived  
Table 2-3.  The present value of cumulative damages (TD) for four scenarios of 
the public health manager’s problem in the context of Hidalgo County, Texas, 
where the time horizon is varied (T) and the capital depreciation rate is varied (). 
Note: The cumulative damages are the bolded values. 
 
  
Capital Depreciation 
() (rate) 
Proportional change in TD 
as  increases  
from 0.05 to 0.10 
    0.05 0.10  
Time Horizon 
(T) (years) 
2 0.60 0.72  0.20  
6 0.59 0.68  0.16  
       
Proportional change in TD 
as T increases from 2 to 6 -0.01 -0.05 
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the influence on total damages would likely be smaller, but still maintain the same 
qualitative directions.  However, for a community involved in planning, the time 
planning horizon and budget level are essentially the primary factors to be considered. 
2.6 Summary and Conclusions 
This paper contributes a model of public health and water service management to 
the health and economics literature.  Though not empirically tested, application of the 
model can explain the reasoning behind certain public health choices, as a result of a 
variety of systemic circumstances, including budget size, accounting stance, planning 
horizon, and rates of capital depreciation.  Several of the model’s theoretical aspects are 
presented and discussed.   The optimal disease management activities are selected on the 
basis of the marginal net benefits that accrue to the Hamiltonian function.  Public health 
managers with a relatively narrow scope, such as those working exclusively with colonia 
residents perceive a greater proportion of infected individuals and therefore are expected 
to perceive greater marginal net benefits to medical treatment relative to preventative 
measures, such as POU.  Greater levels of investment in CM stock are associated with 
lower marginal net benefits to CM expansion.  Greater levels of infection of the public 
are associated with reduced marginal net benefits associated with POU.   
A case study is developed to shed light on institutional characteristics of public 
health and water systems of the Valley.  The model is applied to Hidalgo County, Texas, 
where a small portion of the population does not have access to standard levels of water 
and wastewater services.  The numerical results reinforce the importance of budget size, 
capital depreciation, and institutional design, in the form of public health planning 
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horizons, to the welfare of the modeled community.  The size of the manager’s budget 
dramatically affects the distribution of CM investments through the first years of the 
public health program.  In the latter years, declining CM investments occur.  This is a 
result of the public health manager’s perception of the end of time in the model, after 
which the manager receives no additional benefit from the durability of CM stock. 
The manager’s planning horizon and the durability of CM stocks are shown to 
play a role in the well-being of society.  Greater capital depreciation rates and shorter 
time horizons are shown to be associated with lower community welfare.  Scenarios with 
shorter planning horizons invested less in CM stock.  Lower capital depreciation rates 
allow the community to benefit from more durable CM stocks, which prevents new 
infections and reduces disease damages. 
Several limitations and future avenues of research have already been mentioned, 
but are also included here.  This model is highly generalized in this essay, but could still 
be generalized further, for example, by incorporating the effects of changes to the 
population size.  A non-stationary population-size matters to disease management for 
several reasons.  Population growth can result from birth rates, in which case new 
members of the population increase the size of the susceptible population, thereby 
changing the marginal net benefits of preventative measures relative to treatment 
measures.  Alternatively, population growth can result from immigration, in which case 
new members of the population may be proportionally more, less, or equally infected as 
the community.  Depending if infected people or susceptible people are joining the 
community, the optimal public health management scheme will change.  As one 
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example, results from this study indicate that increasing levels of infection decreases the 
marginal net benefits of POU water services.    
One particularly interesting avenue to explore is the inclusion of disease-induced 
death rates, or virulence.  Disease mortality in the developing world is an significant 
issue for public health.  Including disease mortality in the model described in this essay 
would likely enhance the marginal net benefit of medical treatment.  This may explain, 
why in areas where there are disease-induced deaths from water-borne diseases, medical 
treatments are a greater priority than water-supply enhancements.  Another avenue to 
explore is the allowance of a dynamic budget, where the public health manager could 
borrow and/or store funding.  Results from the case study are not intended to be broad 
generalizations, as they are contingent on the choice of parameter values.  The data 
employed to parameterize the case study are assembled from literature and secondary 
sources.  New data that can be identified or collected would contribute to more 
accurately tailoring the generalized model to generate numerical results specific to 
particular regions and illnesses. 
Other components of the model that fail to fully capture reality include the linear 
cost and the complete non-durability of POU water services and medical treatment.  
Arguments could be made that POU services have some durability and that medical 
services would eventually encounter increasing marginal costs due to, perhaps, 
congestion of medical facilities.  The continuous nature of CM stock is also an 
abstraction.  CM investments are generally considered “lumpy”.  In the case of a single 
municipal facility and its distribution system, the facility is constructed at a given point 
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in time to serve a discrete portion of the current community’s population.  Additionally, 
the effects of capital depreciation to the facility would not occur at a continuous rate.  A 
more realistic description of depreciation is that in year t, CM water service coverage is 
100%.  Then in year t+15 after a natural disaster, a construction accident, or by some 
spontaneous force, a pipeline ruptures and leaves water service coverage at perhaps 
82%.  Modeling any of these items more explicitly is expected to adjust the relative 
positions of the marginal net benefit curves, and thereby have an effect on optimal 
disease management activities.  The intention of the model is to capture the most 
important relative characteristics of each of these activities.  For example, the 
characteristic that CM infrastructure is more like a stock than POU devices, even though 
certain POU devices could be considered stocks.  As another example, while CM stocks 
do not in reality decay at a rate in exact proportion to the size of the stock, CM decay is 
inevitable and, on average, occurs at some constant depreciation rate.  These types of 
modeling challenges are intrinsic to all efforts directed at the generalization and 
simplification of complex problems, such as deciding the best approach to manage a 
community’s water supply system and public health. 
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*Reprinted with permission from “The Water Market for the Middle and Lower Portions 
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Association, 47, 597-610, Copyright 2011 by the American Water Resources 
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CHAPTER III 
THE WATER MARKET FOR  
THE TEXAS LOWER RIO GRANDE VALLEY* 
 
3.1  Introduction 
The middle and lower portions of the Rio Grande basin of Texas have overall 
remained outside of the “Water War” variety of banner news headlines.  This 
accomplishment deserves attention, given this area’s exposure to near record-setting 
drought (TWDB 1998), shortfalls in water deliveries from Mexico (Robinson 2002), and 
exceptional rates of population growth (U.S. Census Bureau 1993, 2007).  The Rio 
Grande (River) originates from headwaters in Colorado, flows through New Mexico, and 
passes into Texas at El Paso.  From El Paso to the Gulf of Mexico, the Rio Grande 
serves as the international boundary between Mexico and the United States.   
Regional water-supply management on the U.S. side of the lower and middle 
portions of the Texas-Mexico stretch of the River is accomplished through cooperative 
efforts of several organizations, including: the Rio Grande Regional Water Planning 
Group (Region M); the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), 
specifically TCEQ’s Office of the Rio Grande Watermaster (Watermaster); and the 
International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) (Table 3-1).  In addition to    
58 
 
 
Table 3-1. Regional water groups of the Falcon-Amistad region of the Rio 
Grande basin in Texas, 2009. 
Falcon-Amistad water market area 
Counties: Cameron, Hidalgo, Willacy, Starr, Jim Hogg, Zapata, Webb, Maverick, Dimmit 
    
Rio Grande Watermaster Program 
Function: Administer, account, and enforce water rights for the Texas Rio Grande Basin 
Harlingen Office 
Function: Conduct Watermaster functions for lower Basin 
Counties: Cameron, Hidalgo, Starr, Willacy, and Zapata 
Eagle Pass Office 
Function: Conduct Watermaster functions for middle Basin 
Counties: Brewster, Dimmit, Hudspeth, Jeff Davis, Jim Hogg, Kinney, Maverick, Presidio, Terrell, and Val Verde 
    
Rio Grande Regional Water Planning Group 
Function: Coordinate long-range water supply planning by bringing together 
stakeholders representing a variety of interests 
Counties: Cameron, Hidalgo, Jim Hogg, Maverick, Starr, Webb, Willacy, and Zapata  
    
Rio Grande Regional Water Authority 
Function: 
Assist in water deliveries from Rio Grande, desalination, water 
supply, wastewater treatment, agricultural water conservation, solid 
waste, state and federal funds; certify water rights held in the 
Authority's counties 
Counties: Cameron, Hidalgo, Starr, Webb Willacy, and Zapata (excluding the City of Laredo) 
    
Lower Rio Grande Valley Development Council 
Function: Serves as an administrative agent for the Rio Grande Regional Water Planning Group 
Counties: Cameron, Hidalgo, and Willacy 
Website: http://www.lrgvdc.org/water.html 
    
Source(s): Rio Grande Watermaster Program (2009); Rio Grande Regional Water 
Planning Group (2009); Lower Rio Grande Valley Development Council (2009); Rio 
Grande Regional Water Authority (2009).  
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these groups, the region has a market for the temporary use and for the permanent 
entitlement of surface water rights from the River. 
TCEQ (2009b) refers to water rights in the middle and lower Texas Rio Grande 
basin as being served by the Falcon-Amistad system.  The system is so named for the 
two reservoirs servicing the area.  Similarly, this essay refers to the water right market 
(i.e. trades and leases of water rights) in this area as the Falcon-Amistad water market, 
and emphasis is made to classify the market as a subsection, or a tool, of the regional 
water management system.  The Falcon-Amistad system encompasses the Texas 
counties (Cameron, Dimmit, Hidalgo, Jim Hogg, Maverick, Starr, Webb, Willacy, and 
Zapata) roughly situated along the Rio Grande from just downstream of the Amistad 
Reservoir to the mouth of the River at the Gulf of Mexico (Figure 3-1).   
 
Figure 3-1.  The location of the Falcon-Amistad water market area.   
Source(s): adapted from Burke et al. (1994). 
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Immigration-fueled U.S. population growth is maintaining a strong pace in the 
Falcon-Amistad region, and has accelerated since the 1970s.  According to U.S. Census 
data from 1970 to 2000, average annual population growth rates of three metropolitan 
statistical areas in the Falcon-Amistad region rival other U.S. cities in high-growth, 
water-stressed areas (U.S. Census Bureau 1993, 2007).   
As regions experience water scarcity, water resource specialists, such as those in 
the Rio Grande basin of New Mexico, study institutional methods to improve water 
conservation (Ward et al. 2007), as well as investigate market mechanisms to manage 
drought (Hadjigeorgalis 2008).  More generally, measuring the effectiveness of water 
marketing and identifying conditions that permit successful water marketing have been 
frequent topics of study in recent years with reviews by Hadjigeorgalis (2009), Chong 
and Sunding (2006), and Kaiser and McFarland (1997).  The Falcon-Amistad water 
market provides an example of such a market-based tool serving a diverse, regional 
water management system that is experiencing constrained supply and increasing 
demand. 
In addition to population growth, the Texas Lower Rio Grande Valley (Valley) 
(i.e., the collective name for the four southernmost counties of the Falcon-Amistad 
region: Cameron, Hidalgo, Starr, and Willacy) has witnessed a series of droughts, 
starting in the late 1980s (Figure 3-2) (National Climatic Data Center 2007).  None of 
these more recent individual droughts have been as severe as the drought of record 
during the 1950s, but combining the length of term for all of these droughts reveals the 
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area enduring dry conditions for 60% of the time between 1990 and the end of 2007 
(Figure 3-2).   
 
Figure 3-2. The Palmer Hydrologic Drought Index for a portion of the Texas 
Lower Rio Grande Valley (i.e., Hidalgo and Cameron Counties). 
Source(s): National Climatic Data Center (2007). 
The Valley is home to a productive agriculture sector.  Since initial water rights 
adjudication in 1971, agricultural users have held the majority of water rights in the 
Valley, as well as in the Falcon-Amistad system at large (NRS 2006; Stubbs et al 2003).  
The quantity of water associated with agricultural and municipal water rights has not 
remained constant.  From the initial allocation in 1971 to early 2007, in conjunction with 
municipal population growth and municipal boundary expansion, 158 million cubic 
meters (Mm3) (or 127,760 acre feet (af)) of water have been added to municipal water 
supplies (Jarvis 2007).  This addition to the region’s municipal water supply is the result 
of a legal and administrative process that converts a water right from agricultural use to 
municipal use.  The reduction of irrigated farmland associated with the 158 Mm3 
(127,760 af) of water converted to municipal water rights during 1971 to 2007 is 
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approximately 381 square kilometers (km2) (94,300 acres or 147 square miles) 
(Jarvis 2007). 
Beyond being a case study with challenging climatic and demographic 
characteristics, the regional management of the Falcon-Amistad region exhibits water 
management policies that resemble proposed policies that are under consideration as 
potential modifications to, and arguably improvements upon, the riparian doctrine that 
dominates the eastern and Midwestern U.S.  Wollmuth and Eheart (2000) and An and 
Eheart (2006) compare two possible water allocation policies in the context of an 
agricultural-irrigation-only corridor of a riparian zone.  One policy regime is called a 
“Non-prioritized fixed-volume permits” and the other is termed “Fractional flow set-
aside.”  Temporarily borrowing their terminology, the Falcon-Amistad system can be 
thought of as a hybrid regime of “Fixed-volume permits for some; fractional flows for 
others.”  The real-world experiences of the Falcon-Amistad system can provide guidance 
and insight to water managers and stakeholders in riparian areas of the U.S. who are 
considering modifications and alternatives to their current policies.   
Another feature that is somewhat unique to the Falcon-Amistad system and 
relevant to other regional management groups considering new policy is the ability for 
irrigation water rights holders to make use of available storage capacity in the system’s 
reservoirs.  Irrigation water rights holders can “bank” their water month to month, and 
year to year, in what essentially constitutes a water account that is administered by the 
Watermaster.  Giving irrigation water right holders the option to store their water for 
future use makes these agents aware of a specific type of opportunity cost associated 
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with using their water; i.e., water that is diverted today must be at least as valuable in use 
as the discounted value of that diversion in the future.  Diverters aware of this 
opportunity cost will engage in more efficient behavior than those under alternative 
regimes that adhere to a “use it or lose it” policy.  Cornforth and Lacewell (1981) studied 
farm production in the El Paso, Texas, area and demonstrated that the ability for farmers 
to store water in the Elephant-Butte Reservoir of New Mexico not only improves net 
farm returns, but also decreases the year-to-year variation in the returns to farming.  
Understanding the institutions of the Falcon-Amistad system can lead to tools for 
regional water management.  Institutional knowledge like that identified in this paper is 
an important input for constructing complex models to analyze polices under a variety of 
conditions—like, for example, the Rio Grande basin in New Mexico and west Texas 
(Ward et al. 2006; and Booker et al. 2005). 
This article discusses the structure and functionality of the Falcon-Amistad water 
market, including the institutions and geographic particulars that enable the market to 
operate.  The discussion is facilitated by presentation of data from a variety of sources, 
with the majority of the data coming from the Texas Lower Rio Grande Valley.  The 
historical trends of water market activity are presented and discussed, followed by a 
discussion of the Falcon-Amistad region’s water-related institutions.  Finally, 
suggestions are presented to anticipate, and possibly mitigate, potential complications to 
market operations from groundwater depletion and to the environmental well-being of 
the River, specifically regarding instream flows. 
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3.2  Water Market Definition 
Certain criteria must be met for a water market to exist within a regional water 
management system.  The criteria are, from Saliba and Bush (1987), (a) that a portion of 
a supply system’s right to use water be owned by individuals (either people or firms), 
(b) those rights must be transferrable among these market participants, and (c) claims to 
these rights must be respected and secured property rights.  This definition implicitly 
assumes the transportation of a unit of water to a new point of use within the region is 
technically feasible, which is the case for the Falcon-Amistad system.  Once transfers of 
secure rights between two different water right holders are allowed to occur, 
demarcating the location and range of the water market is essentially the same task as 
locating technical and legal feasibility boundaries that apply to these transactions.   
Legal boundaries can be built across distances and across institutions.  For 
example, transactions may only be permitted in a given river basin, such as the Rio 
Grande, and may only be allowed among specific types of users, such as agriculturalists 
or municipal suppliers.  Restrictions on trades concerning different types of water use 
exist in the Falcon-Amistad water market.  Specifically, short-term trades (or leases) 
between agricultural use and municipal use are prohibited in the Falcon-Amistad system 
(Characklis et al. 1999; Stubbs et al. 2003). 
Herein, ‘water market’ is used as an umbrella term, referring to all of the types of 
water transactions that may occur within the Falcon-Amistad system.  A variety of 
transactions are possible (e.g., permanent sale of water rights, temporary lease of water-
right entitlement, and long-term contracts for water-right entitlement).  Each type of 
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transaction could constitute its own market, depending on the accounting stance of the 
market researcher.  Within the Falcon-Amistad system, all of these transactions are 
relatively simple to execute when compared to any hypothetical transaction with entities 
outside the region.  In the State of Texas, interbasin transfers of water are subject to a 
relatively-extended review process outlined in the Texas Water Code, Chapter 11 (Texas 
Water Code 2001). 
One objective of this article is to determine if the Falcon-Amistad water market 
behaves in accordance with economic theory.  Indications that the market is behaving as 
theory suggests are evidenced by market transactions that transfer water (i.e., permanent 
water rights) from those with lower values and to those with higher values for water.  
Further, given the limited supply of water rights and the area’s increasing water demand, 
driven by population growth, the real price of a water right in a functioning market 
would be expected to increase.  If these two conditions are upheld and market 
externalities are limited, then economists have reason to believe that transactions are 
contributing in some capacity to social welfare improvement.  To be more explicit, the 
objective is not to demonstrate any degree of formal market efficiency.  The objective is, 
rather, to evaluate if, overall, market transactions appear to be allocating resources to 
those groups and individuals who place the greatest value on the resource.  In such a 
case and with minimal externalities, the market may be said to be improving efficiency 
(Griffin 2006b).  In an analysis of selected transactions from the Falcon-Amistad water 
market, Chang and Griffin (1992) found that the benefits accruing to water-right buyers 
were greater than the opportunity cost of water-right sellers.  This study adopts a 
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different approach than Chang and Griffin (1992) and analyzes an updated catalogue of 
water right transactions that have occurred since 1992. 
An additional objective of this article is to determine what, if any, institutions are 
promoting the effectiveness of a market, either by minimizing externalities, ensuring the 
property values of water rights are maintained, or by lowering market transaction costs.  
Identifying the role played by institutions in the operation and functionality of the 
market provides a basis for locating areas of potential improvement and policy 
recommendations to further enhance social welfare in the market area.  And further, 
Falcon-Amistad institutions, once identified as effective, may be replicated in other 
regions of the world, by other regional water resource managers, whose regions are 
enduring water scarcity and who are looking to improve, expand, or diversify their 
portfolio of water resource management policies and tools. 
3.3 Falcon-Amistad Water Market Description 
Several articles outline the history and functionality of the Falcon-Amistad water 
market (Chang and Griffin 1992; Characklis et al. 1999; Jarvis 1991, 2007; Kaiser 1987; 
Levine 2007; Schoolmaster 1991; Stubbs et al. 2003; Wurbs 2004).  Like much of the 
western United States, the majority of the state of Texas follows the prior appropriations 
doctrine, which employs the principle of “first in time, first in right” (Griffin 2006b).  
The Falcon-Amistad region is the only place in Texas that follows a different system of 
water rights.  The Falcon-Amistad water rights system was essentially put in place 
following the conclusion of the Valley Water Suit, i.e. State of Texas v. Hidalgo County 
Water Control and Improvement District No. 18 (1969), which defined the water-rights 
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system for the lower portion of the Rio Grande basin of Texas as permitted entitlements 
to correlated shares of the River.  In 1982, water rights in the middle portion of the Rio 
Grande basin of Texas were defined using essentially the same mechanism (i.e., as had 
been used in the lower basin since the conclusion of the Valley Water Suit) (NRS 2006).  
Today the lower and middle portions of the Texas Rio Grande basin combine to form 
what is essentially called the Falcon-Amistad region in this paper. 
In contrast to the prior appropriations doctrine, which gives priority to users with 
the longest history of withdrawals, the correlated shares doctrine generally gives no such 
priority and usually treats rights holders as having equal priority.  Water rights in the 
Falcon-Amistad region employ a unique type of correlated shares doctrine that has three 
tiers of priority, with priority of the right determined by the type of use (i.e., DMI or 
Irrigation) and by the diversion history (i.e., class A or class B) associated with the water 
right. 
Market Participants 
The agents in the Falcon-Amistad water market generally fall into three 
categories: (a) individuals, (b) irrigation districts, and (c) municipal suppliers.  Irrigation 
districts own the majority of irrigation water rights and “hold” and divert against a 
significant proportion of municipal rights for the respective municipalities.  Thus, they 
divert the majority of raw water from the River.  Municipal water suppliers of the region 
are privately owned or public utilities.  In either case, the municipal supplier typically 
has its water delivered by an irrigation district, but in some cases, it may divert its own 
water or lease water from an irrigation district. 
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Types of Rights 
The Falcon-Amistad system makes a clear distinction between water rights used 
for irrigation and those associated with domestic, municipal, or industrial uses.  These 
latter three uses are afforded greater priority than irrigation water in the Falcon-Amistad 
system.  A DMI water right entitles the right holder to 1.23 thousand cubic meters 
(TCM) (1 af) diversion per year from the River.  An irrigation water right entitles a right 
holder to a share of the inflows to the Falcon and Amistad reservoirs.  Within the sub-
category of irrigation rights, an additional tier of priority affords greater reservoir inflow 
amounts to two different classes of irrigation rights (class A and class B).  Unlike 
municipal water rights, which entitle the right holder to a “use it or lose it” type of 
annual diversion, irrigation rights are associated with bankable water accounts at the 
Office of the Watermaster.  Therefore, irrigation rights holders’ account of divertible 
water can be low, full, or even overfilled; but the volume of water inside the diverter’s 
account may not exceed 1.4 times the allocation given during the original adjudication of 
the water rights.  Many of these peculiarities of the Falcon-Amistad system, including 
the duties of the Office of the Watermaster and the operations of releases and storages in 
the reservoir system, are investigated in greater detail by Characklis et al. (1999), Levine 
(2007), Stubbs et al. (2003), and Wurbs (2004). 
Transferability of Water Rights 
Intrasectoral water rights are fully transferrable in the Falcon-Amistad water 
market, which is to say irrigation water rights are fully tradable among irrigation users 
and DMI water rights are fully tradable among DMI users.  To clarify, ‘fully tradable’ 
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means a right can be permanently purchased or sold and the water entitlement can be 
leased, contracted, or optioned to other similar users, i.e., users in the same sector.  
Trades from one sector into another, or intersectoral trades, are more complicated and 
more closely regulated than intrasectoral trades.  Such restrictions on water trades are 
believed by many economists to be sources of inefficiency.  The transfer particulars are 
explored in several locations (Schoolmaster 1991; Stubbs et al. 2003; NRS 2006; 
Levine 2007) and are summarized below. 
Since DMI rights are afforded a higher priority than irrigation rights (i.e., one 
year’s supply of DMI diversions is reinstated in the municipal reserve monthly), 
transferring water rights from agricultural use to DMI use involves converting an 
irrigation right, which is a bankable entitlement to a share of reservoir inflows, into a 
DMI right, which is a reserved, fixed quantity of a permitted annual diversion and 
otherwise is not bankable.  The A and B subdivisions of irrigation water rights also carry 
different weights when converted to DMI water rights.  Conversion rates correspond to 
the higher monthly allocation rate accorded to class A rights over class B rights.  When 
class A irrigation water rights are converted into DMI water rights, the amount of water 
associated with the irrigation rights is reduced to 50% of the original (i.e., irrigation) 
water value.  Similarly, but using a stronger reduction factor, when a class B irrigation 
water right is converted into a DMI water right, the amount of water associated with the 
irrigation right is reduced to 40% of original water amount (Schoolmaster 1991; 
Jensen 1987; Stubbs et al. 2003). 
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The Falcon-Amistad water-rights system supports a thriving market for leased 
water, which is also called “wet water,” “contract(s)” water (Chang and Griffin 1992; 
NRS 2006), or “spot market sales” (Yoskowitz 1999).  Unlike permanent sales of water 
rights, leased water cannot be transferred outside of a sector.  Leasing transactions of 
DMI water to irrigation water or irrigation water to DMI water are forbidden by law 
(Characklis et al. 1999).  Permanent sales are the focus later in this article, because this 
market transaction captures the Falcon-Amistad system’s intersectoral trading, which 
may be relevant to other regional water systems that observe competition for water from 
two different sectors and the expansion of urban/municipal interests into historically 
agricultural areas. 
3.4 Falcon-Amistad Water Market Analysis 
Historical Trends of Water Allocations 
Population growth and the associated expansion of municipal boundaries, and 
agricultural acreage reductions are driving the reallocation from agricultural to 
municipal use in the Falcon-Amistad water market.  The data used for much of the 
following discussion are from the Watermaster’s Harlingen Office which covers the four 
Valley counties and Zapata County.  Since water right ownership of Zapata County is 
less than 12 TCM (10 af), the following figures are presented as Valley-wide data.  
Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-4 are displays, respectively, of total allocations of DMI water 
rights and the total allocation of irrigation water rights in the Valley.   
The upward trend of municipal water rights in Figure 3-3 corresponds to an 
average annual growth rate of 2.62% in the amount of municipal water rights in the  
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Figure 3-3. Historical trends of total authorized water rights* (use types 
municipal, domestic, and industrial; and summed up as all DMI) allocated in the 
Texas Lower Rio Grande Valley. 
Source(s): Unpublished data from the Rio Grande Watermaster’s office.   
Note: *Data missing for 1990, 1991, and 1992. 
Valley from 1989 to 2008.  Population projections from the Region M Water Plan (NRS 
2006) indicate an estimated population growth rate of 2.94% for the entire region from 
1990 to 2010.  The similarity between the growth rates suggests regional municipalities 
are anticipating increasing water demand and acquiring water rights to fill this demand.  
Note in Figure 3-3, the total quantity of DMI water rights decreased from 2007 to 2008.  
This is due to a sequence of transactions between the City of Laredo, which is not 
located in the Valley, and Valley IDs in which the City of Laredo purchased 3,330 TCM 
(2,700 af) of domestic use water rights.  The growth in municipal rights is slightly less 
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than the estimated growth in population.  This disparity may be explained by past actions 
of the municipal suppliers in which they purchased water rights in advance of growth 
and more recently have been expending those rights instead of buying new ones. 
The decreasing trend shown in Figure 3-4 corresponds to an annual loss rate of 
0.50% for total irrigation water rights in the Valley from 1989 to 2008.  Due to 
municipal development expansion into the Valley irrigation districts, agricultural lands 
within the Valley irrigation districts were reduced at an annual rate of 0.73% between 
1996 and 2006 (calculated from Leigh et al. 2009).  The levels of agricultural lands and  
 
Figure 3-4. Historical trends of total authorized water rights* (use types class A 
irrigation, class B irrigation and summed up as all irrigation) allocated in the Texas 
Lower Rio Grande Valley. 
 Source(s): Unpublished data from the Rio Grande Watermaster’s office.   
Note: *Data missing for 1990, 1991, and 1992. 
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demographic landscape shifts towards the urban and suburban, water resources are 
allowed to shift from the agriculture sector to municipalities and/or industries.  Reasons 
that the Valley’s irrigation districts’ lands are being reduced at a faster rate (albeit slight) 
than the rate irrigation rights are being reduced may be due to resistance on the part of 
the irrigation districts to relinquish their water rights (e.g., retaining water rights to 
insure against shortfalls during extended drought).   
A disparity exists between municipal allocations and municipal diversions of the 
Valley, because municipalities do not divert the entire volume of their legal right.  This 
disparity may be accounted for by municipal suppliers’ purchases of water rights in 
anticipation of future growth, such a disparity is typical of urban reliability planning.  
Note the level of DMI water reserved for the next year’s use is based on DMI diversions, 
not total right ownership. 
Historical Trend of the DMI Water Right Market Price 
Demand growth, a relatively-fixed supply of water, and a functioning water-right 
market generate price signals in the Falcon-Amistad system.  The price signals are 
indicative of an overall trend in rising opportunity costs of water rights in the region 
from the early 1980s to the present, with the most significant price increases occurring 
1998 to 2002.  An examination of inflation-adjusted data reveals the real price of water 
rights remained relatively constant during the early 1980s to the late 1990s (Figure 3-5), 
with market transactions primarily characterized by small irrigation rights holders (i.e., 
not IDs) as sellers and municipal suppliers as buyers (Stubbs et al., 2003; Chang and 
Griffin, 1992).  By 2000, the municipal suppliers seem to have sought out and cleared 
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the market of many smaller rights holders.  In other words, as demand for water rights is 
increasing, as a consequence of population growth, the supply of water rights is held 
fixed, ownership levels by irrigators and irrigation districts are not increasing.  The 
outcome suggested by economic theory is that as a market exhausts low cost supplies, in 
this case water rights’ owners with a low willingness-to-accept for their water rights, 
market demanders will face increasing prices, thereby moving upward and along the 
water rights’ supply curve. 
 
Figure 3-5. Historical data of DMI water rights prices in the Falcon-Amistad 
water market. 
Source(s): Caroom and Maxwell (2005); Chang and Griffin (1992); Characklis et al. 
(1999); Griffin and Characklis (2002); Levine (2007); NRS (2001, 2003, 2006); 
Schoolmaster (1991). 
Note: *Inflation rate = 2% (Rister et al. 2009); base year is 2008. 
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Since 2000, the active agents in the market primarily consist of municipal 
suppliers and IDs (Stubbs et al. 2003), with municipal suppliers purchasing water from 
IDs.  Even though they are highly involved in market activity, IDs seem to be reluctant 
to sell water rights for two reasons.  First, the IDs monthly water account credits 
(maintained by the Watermaster) are dependent on their pro rata share of the system-
wide total amount of irrigation water rights.  Thus, IDs use the retention of water rights 
as “insurance” during drought to maximize their pro-rata share of monthly account 
credits.  Secondly, water delivery via irrigation canals and pipelines is an enterprise with 
increasing returns to scale (Chang and Griffin 1992), meaning that large-volume water 
delivery businesses are associated with high initial fixed costs, and decreasing average 
costs as more clients are brought into the delivery network.   
The typical ID in the Falcon-Amistad system is evolving to meet the demands of 
the expanding municipal sector, but the IDs continue to have legal obligations and 
financial incentives to serve the agricultural users of their districts.  Growing demand 
from the municipal sector, the IDs relative lack of incentive to sell water rights, the 
2000-2002 drought conditions, and risk aversion to future drought have contributed to 
the real price of a water right increasing by more than $1/m3 (or $1,000/af) since 1999 
(Figure 3-5).   
Anecdotal reports of speculative purchases suggest water rights as a long-term 
investment opportunity may also be contributing to increases in prices (Hinojosa 2009).  
A Linear Dummy model and a Liebig model were regressed on the price data 
(Figure 3-6).  The graphs of these two models illustrate similar stories about the market’s 
76 
 
 
price trends.  Namely, that from 1983 to the late 1990s, no apparent change in prices 
occurred; and after a point in the late 1990s, approximately 1998, prices tended to 
increase (Appendix E). 
The independent variables in the Linear Dummy and Liebig model may include 
the effect of any of many time-correlated phenomena, or time-independent events, which 
impacted the Falcon-Amistad region from 1983 to 2005.  These events may include the 
passage of Senate Bill 1 (SB1) (TWDB 2009) in 1997.  The subsequent execution of the 
regional water plans mandated by SB1 may have increased water market participants’ 
 
 
Figure 3-6. Historical data (1983-2005) of DMI water rights prices in the Falcon-
Amistad water market and the plots of two regression models, 2009. 
Source(s): Analyses and adaptation from nominal prices reported in Caroom and 
Maxwell (2005); Chang and Griffin (1992); Characklis et al. (1999); Griffin and 
Characklis (2002); Levine (2007); NRS (2001, 2003, 2006); Schoolmaster (1991). 
Note: *Inflation rate = 2% (Rister et al. 2009); base year is 2008. 
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awareness of the quantity and the prospects for future water supplies in the region.  
Intermittent drought in the mid-to-late 1990s and the notable drought in the early 2000s, 
during which the Rio Grande ceased to flow into the Gulf of Mexico (Samson 2008), 
may also have contributed to the increase in water prices.  As indicated by Stubbs et al. 
(2003), once the small irrigation rights holders sold their water rights to cities and had 
been cleared of the market, possibly around the year 2000, municipalities were left to 
purchase any additional water rights from IDs, which have strong incentives to retain 
their water rights.   
Characterization of Past Transactions 
From July 1996 to January 2009, title changes, or changes of permanent 
ownership, associated with Falcon-Amistad water rights have been documented in the 
Harlingen Watermaster’s Office.  Once again for simplicity, this five-county 
administrative area is referred to as the Valley.  An analysis was conducted of 418 of 
those title changes, which involved a variety of individuals/private organizations, 
irrigation districts, municipal suppliers, government agencies, and environmental groups.  
Some title changes were omitted from this analysis, including those which appeared to 
involve two or more members of the same family.  Identifying the nature of the title 
change was no exact science.  The general rule of thumb that this study followed was 
that if two or more title change participants had identical surnames, then the title change 
was determined to be a gift between kin and not a representative market transaction.  Of 
the 418 remaining title changes, some could be non-market exchanges of property 
between friends, or family members that do not share the same surname; discerning this 
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from the Watermaster’s records was not possible.  Nevertheless, the authors are 
confident that the overall trends in title changes reported in Table 3-2 are qualitatively 
similar to the trends of the subset containing genuine market transactions.  Table 3-2 
displays a summary of these title changes, referred to as transactions, and organized by 
the type of right owner involved in the transaction. 
The summary data presented in Table 3-2 indicate that individual rights holders 
have been the most active sellers of water both in terms of the number of transactions in 
which they are involved and by accounting for the greatest proportion of water volume 
sold.  The most active water purchasers in terms of number of transactions were also the 
individual rights holders.  However, municipal suppliers are the greatest volume 
purchaser of water rights.  IDs are the second-most frequent user type to participate in 
transactions as a seller, participating in approximately 11% of sales (Table 3-2).  If IDs 
are sellers, the quantity of water transacted tends to be much higher than if individual 
rights holders are sellers.  From 1996 to 2008, the average quantity per trade with an 
irrigation district as seller is approximately 563 TCM (457 af), while the quantity per 
trade with an individual as seller is approximately 164 TCM (133 af) (Table 3-2).  As 
would be expected given the Valley’s growth in population during the 1990s and 2000s 
and the Valley’s expanding municipal sector, municipal suppliers are net purchasers of 
water rights and irrigation districts are net sellers of water rights. 
To further evaluate the nature of these transactions, consider the water use values 
associated with the two water-using sectors, agricultural and municipal.  The returns to 
an acre foot of water used in the Valley agriculture are estimated at $139 (Seawright 
  
Table 3-2. Summary of recorded water market transactions from May 1996 to December 2008 in the Falcon-
Amistad water market for the Texas Lower Rio Grande Valley, 2009. 
 
    Individuals 
Irrigation 
Districts 
Municipal 
Suppliers 
Environ
mental 
Groups 
Government 
Agencies 
Others 
and 
Unknown Total 
Total transactions as 
seller 
# 359 46 7 3 1 2 418d 
percent 85.89% 11.00% 1.67% 0.72% 0.24% 0.48% 100% 
Total quantitya of 
water sold 
TCMb 58,767 25,916 294 389 7 556 85,930 
afc 47,643 21,010 239 315 6 451 69,664 
percent 68.39% 30.16% 0.34% 0.45% 0.01% 0.65% 100% 
Average quantity sold 
per transaction 
TCM 164 563 42 130 7 278 206 
af 133 457 34 105 6 226 167 
Total transactions as 
buyer 
# 194 19 176 9 17 2 417d 
percent 46.52% 4.56% 42.21% 2.16% 4.08% 0.48% 100% 
Total quantity of water 
bought 
TCM 28,569 3,937 46,624 1,530 4,390 344 85,393 
af 23,161 3,192 37,798 1,240 3,559 279 69,229 
percent 33.46% 4.61% 54.60% 1.79% 5.14% 0.40% 100% 
Average quantity 
bought per transaction 
TCM 147 207 265 170 258 172 205 
af 119 168 215 138 209 140 166 
Total net quantity 
purchased 
TCM -30,198 -21,979 46,329 1,141 4,382 -212 -537d 
af -24,482 -17,819 37,560 925 3,553 -172 -435 
                  
Source(s): Unpublished data from the Rio Grande Watermaster’s office. 
a
 To ease data presentation, all water quantities were converted to their DMI equivalents.  For example, a transaction 
involving 100 thousand m3 (TCM) of Irrigation B water converts to a 40 TCM DMI equivalent in the table.  
b,c
 Thousand cubic meters referred to as TCM. Acre feet referred to as af. 
d
 Total buyer transactions differs from total seller transactions because one transaction log entry did not list the buyer.  Also, 
for this reason, the total net quantity purchased for all users is -537 TCM, the quantity of the log entry with no buyer. 
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et al. 2009).  In the municipal sector, water treatment costs can provide a lower bound on 
the value of water to municipal users.  Municipal water treatment costs in the Valley 
have been estimated in the range of $615 to $968 per acre foot (Boyer et al. 2010).  
Considering that agricultural interests, represented by IDs, are net sellers of water rights 
and that municipal water suppliers are net purchasers of water rights (Table 3-2) and that 
agricultural water use values have been estimated to be substantially lower than that 
estimated for municipal treatment costs, the transfer of water from the agricultural sector 
to the municipal sector constitutes a transfer of water rights from lower-valued use to 
higher-valued use. 
Has the Falcon-Amistad Water Market Been Successful? 
The two criteria established early in this article to determine if the water market 
is functioning according to economic theory are, by and large, satisfied by the data 
presented in the previous sections.  Namely, in the Falcon-Amistad system, water 
allocations have shifted from lower-valued agricultural uses to higher-valued municipal 
and urban uses, with IDs and individuals being net sellers of water rights and municipal 
water suppliers being net purchasers of water rights.  Simultaneously, as competition for 
water from the growing municipal sector has resulted in increasing demand for water 
from the River, the real market price of a water right has increased by more than $1/m3 
(or $1,000/af) since 1999. 
The rules governing transactions and administration of the Falcon-Amistad water 
market have not changed materially since water rights were adjudicated following the 
Valley Water Suit of 1969.  The system’s success spurred adoption of the same doctrine 
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in the middle portion of the Rio Grande basin of Texas, thus forming what is today the 
Falcon-Amistad water market area.  The endurance of this regional water management 
system under challenging conditions, namely rapid population growth, drought, under-
delivery of water by Mexico, and demand competition between two sectors, is 
noteworthy.  Three reasons for the market’s apparent success are discussed below.   
Howe, Schurmeier, and Shaw (1986) state the “main administrative problem in 
water markets is the existence of ‘third-party’ effects that take the form of changed 
return flows, changed groundwater levels, and water quality changes.”  Third-party 
effects are roughly defined as externalities (positive or negative) imposed on a party not 
directly involved in the market transaction.  Many water markets have limitations and 
procedures in place to protect against these kinds of, usually negative, third-party effects.  
Examples of market limitations include no-injury rules, designed to prevent harmful 
third-party effects; and area of origin restrictions, designed to keep water in its original 
basin (Anderson and Snyder 1997).   
A common procedure for curbing harmful return flow externalities are a series of 
public announcements of proposed water trades followed up by one or more open-to-
public committee hearings, so that any potentially impacted third-parties can voice their 
opinions (Chang and Griffin, 1992), as is the case of interbasin transfers in Texas.  
While these processes ensure more trades are neutral (or Pareto) efficient transactions, 
they do so by ratcheting upward the market’s transaction costs, thereby inhibiting trade 
and possibly slowing the advance towards aggregate efficiency. 
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A consequence of the market’s fairly unique geographic circumstances, 
transaction costs that are associated with mitigating return flows in many—if not most 
other—water markets do not affect the Falcon-Amistad water market.  Schoolmaster 
(1991), as well as Chang and Griffin (1992), point out the relative non-existence of 
third-party effects and return flow externalities in the Falcon-Amistad water market.  
The geographic location of the Valley as the final leg of the River and the area having its 
gravity flow away from the Rio Grande (through an extensive network of drainage 
ditches) combine to all but eliminate third-party effects and return flows from being 
factors in this market area.  In effect, diversions from the River downstream of Falcon 
Reservoir constitute full and consumptive use of the diverted water, so any would-be 
return flows exit the water market arena via the drainage ditch system.   
 “Private property does not enforce itself” (Friedman 2000) and the costs of 
enforcement and monitoring may prove to be prohibitive to market-based tools for water 
resource management.  In the Falcon-Amistad system, however, the Watermaster heads 
up an effective monitoring and enforcement effort with its costs paid for by revenues 
from service fees charged to water diverters in the Falcon-Amistad system.  Both Chang 
and Griffin (1992) and Yoskowitz (1999) note the Watermaster’s successful 
enforcement of water rights.  Yoskowitz goes on to note that the Watermaster’s 
enforcement efforts contribute to the overall effectiveness of the market.  The Texas 
Administrative Code empowers the Watermaster to take “necessary actions to 
effectively cease any unauthorized diversion or impoundment of state water” (Texas 
Administrative Code 1999).  The Watermaster can report the violator to the executive 
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director of TCEQ, who can issue fines of up to $1,000 per day of continued wrongdoing.  
The issue can also be taken up in court by the state attorney general.  
The allowance for irrigation rights holders to bank (or store) their water month-
to-month in the Falcon and Amistad reservoirs is worthy of further mention.  Brennan 
(2008) describes the absence of clearly defined property rights over stored water in the 
context of a missing market, and presents an analysis of an Australian water system 
whereby incorporating storage values improves the benefits from engaging in water 
transactions.  While irrigation rights holders in the Falcon-Amistad system retain the 
rights to their stored water (up to 1.4 times the volume of their initial water account), 
DMI rights holders are not afforded such rights.  Therefore, the opportunity costs faced 
by DMI rights holders to divert water in the current year do not include the value of that 
water’s use in a future year.  This aspect of the water market’s design does not 
encourage efficient use of DMI water across time periods as is done by the bankability 
policy that applies to irrigation rights holders.   
What Does the Future Hold for the Falcon-Amistad Water Market? 
The rising costs of acquiring Falcon-Amistad surface water rights have been one 
motivating force which has increased interest in alternative water supply technologies.  
The Region M water plan identified brackish groundwater desalination as the second-
largest projected contributor to regional water supplies, with acquisition of additional 
water from the Rio Grande via market exchanges as the single largest contributor (NRS 
2006).  The most recent geologic survey of the Valley concluded that the Gulf Coast 
Aquifer may experience declining water levels and aquifer storage given a drought of 
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record and a continuation of pumping trends occurring during 1980 to 1999 (Chowdhury 
and Mace 2007).  Chowdhury and Mace (2007) reported extraction rates from prior to 
1999 that are likely to be underestimates of current (i.e., 2009) extraction rates, given 
that multiple brackish groundwater desalination projects have come online after 1999.  
Since 1999, the development of brackish groundwater desalination facilities across the 
Valley is expected to have accelerated groundwater withdrawals in the area.  Because 
the Gulf Coast aquifer is hydrologically connected to the River, reduced water levels in 
the aquifer may induce greater seepage from the River into the aquifer.  At some time in 
the future, the operational reserve of the Falcon-Amistad reservoir may require 
adjustment, to account for greater conveyance losses due to greater seepage when water 
is transported from the reservoirs down the River to the diverters. 
A component of the Texas Water Bank, which is operated by the TWDB (Wurbs 
2004), is the Texas Water Trust.  The Texas Water Trust operates as a depository for 
water rights that have been voluntarily donated to the care of the state to be “dedicated to 
environmental needs, including instream flows, water quality, fish and wildlife habitat, 
or bay and estuary inflows” (Texas Water Code 1999).  No water rights in the records 
from the Harlingen Watermaster’s office have been designated for environmental use 
(Texas Commission on Environmental Quality 2009a).  Instream flow allocations may 
have been insufficient in past years, such as 2001, when the River notoriously failed to 
flow into the Gulf of Mexico and a sandbar developed across the mouth (National 
Research Council 2005; Samson 2008).  As a consequence of the sandbar, the 
Watermaster’s Harlingen Office and U.S. Homeland Security authorities agreed to 
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sustain a minimum flow from the River to the Gulf to prevent the development of any 
sandbars in the future (Yarrito 2009).  Nevertheless, the current arrangement of instream 
flows management may seem inadequate.  Market-based provision of instream flows are 
likely subject to a free-rider problem and non-market provision of instream flows are 
motivated primarily by Homeland Security concerns rather than environmental concerns. 
Two ownership categories exist for Valley farmers: those who own water rights; 
and those who are serviced by an ID-owned water right.  Farmers of the first group are 
water market participants and the market’s end users.  Farmers of the latter group are 
only end users in the water market.  Since they are not right owners and cannot sell the 
water right, they are not considered to be market participants.  The inability of a water 
market’s end user to directly participate in the market, is referred to as a disconnect issue 
(Griffin 2006a) or a compensation problem (Smith 1989).  This may impede market 
trading and/or the adoption of water conserving practices.  IDs and municipal suppliers 
are not disconnected from the market, and are therefore incentivized (to some degree) to 
consider the opportunity costs of the water rights they hold and the diverted water they 
could conserve by making capital improvements.  The disconnect of some of the water 
market’s end users (i.e., farmers who are served by an ID) from the market and, by 
extension, from certain water-conserving incentives constitute valid grounds from which 
to be critical of the current water market’s institutional arrangements.  
3.5  Summary and Conclusions 
Since the early 1970s, the water market of the lower and middle portions of the 
Rio Grande basin has functioned like a typical market for a normal good.  Demand for 
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water has increased, especially from municipal water suppliers, and the supply of water 
from the River is more-or-less constrained by the yields of nature and the climate.  As a 
consequence of increasing demand and relatively fixed supply, the price of a water right 
in the Falcon-Amistad system has risen to reflect higher opportunity costs of diverting 
water from the River.  This market has functioned well as a regional water-management 
tool, particularly given the region’s experiences and the fact that the Falcon-Amistad 
system has remained operational and largely unchanged.  Contributing towards the water 
market’s success is the region’s geographic location at the terminus of the Rio Grande 
and the consequential elimination of return flow complications to market transactions.  
Equally important, the Watermaster effectively monitors and enforces the diversions 
along the River, i.e., since water rights are closely administered, their values are well 
maintained. 
The Gulf Coast Aquifer may become an issue for this market in the future.  
Assuming groundwater pumping accelerates, water tables may fall and reaches of the 
River may experience increased seepage.  Monitoring for any hydrologic changes may 
be important to determine if future adjustment to the water market’s operations could be 
useful.  Protecting instream flows for environmental demand seems fairly 
straightforward for stretches of the Rio Grande in the Falcon-Amistad region.  Water 
rights can be purchased at the market price and then entered into the Water Trust; even 
so, some environmental concerns over the River seem to be ongoing.  In spite of these 
potential issues and the compensation problem, the Falcon-Amistad system provides, 
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what is overall, a positive example of the effectiveness of a market-based tool used in 
regional water management, within the context of existing institutional arrangements. 
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CHAPTER IV  
HYDROECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF  
THE TEXAS LOWER RIO GRANDE VALLEY WATER SUPPLIES UNDER 
URBANIZATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
4.1  Introduction 
Hydroeconomic models are computer-based water-management and water-
research tools that incorporate aspects of hydrology and economic behavior to advise 
and provide implications for the water management decision-making process and water 
management practices (Ward 2009; Harou et al. 2009).  Hydroeconomic models can take 
a variety of forms and include a variety of components, depending on the particular 
question(s) being addressed.  Issues addressed by application of  hydroeconomic models 
in Texas and the southwestern United States may include: water planning (Gillig et al. 
2001), groundwater management (McCarl et al. 1999), recreational uses (Ward and 
Lynch 1996, 1997), water market institutions (Characklis et al. 1999, 2006; McCarl et al. 
1999; Cai and McCarl 2009), water pricing (Ward and Pulido-Velaquez 2008, 2009), 
environmental and species-habitat uses (McCarl et al. 1999), and climate change and 
drought (Booker et al. 2005; Ward et al. 2006; Cai and McCarl 2009).  Recently, the 
important components and basic structures of these models have been summarized by 
Ward (2009) and Harou et al. (2009).   
The study area for this paper includes three agriculturally-prominent and 
municipally-diverse southern Texas counties: Cameron, Hidalgo, and Willacy.  These 
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counties are located along the Texas U.S.-Mexico border at the mouth of the Rio Grande 
(the River) (Figure 1-1).  Decision makers across the region are considering several 
alternative water-supply and water-management alternatives to address water issues, 
including brackish groundwater desalination and seawater desalination (NRS 2008, 
2010b).  In the next 50 years, more than a doubling of the current population is 
anticipated in this region (NRS 2010a).  This population growth will expand municipal 
borders into what is currently productive farmland and will require substantial quantities 
of water from the river system that has traditionally been used to support the irrigated 
agriculture sector.  Compounding increased water competition on the demand side, 
global climate change may permanently and substantially alter the natural yield of the 
region’s primary water source, the River, as well as the physiological performance of 
agricultural crops.   
The River serves as an international border, and is subject to several long-
standing water-sharing agreements between neighboring nations and states 
(Martin 2010).  As recent as a decade ago, some of those terms were tested when 
Mexico defaulted on obligations to deliver water to the River for use on the U.S. side 
(Robinson 2002).  These circumstances portray a region that likely will experience rising 
water scarcity in the coming decades and, as such, provide an impetus for research such 
as this essay to better understand the region’s water supply alternatives, water 
management institutions, and projected impacts.  Regional stakeholders have 
demonstrated forward resolve to address present and future water-scarcity issues (Rister 
et al. 2011).  The goal of this paper is to provide guidance to those efforts, offer a picture 
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of what the future may hold for the Valley’s water resources, and suggest policies to 
mitigate foreseeable challenges to regional water management.   
The description of a hydroeconomic model developed for the Valley, 
incorporating aspects of urban-agricultural change in both water and land resources, is 
included in this essay.  This model captures many of the unique institutions of the 
Valley, including the modeling of two different methods of water right reallocation, one 
explicitly linked to land-use change and the other explicitly divorced from land-use 
change.  The model is parameterized to represent the years 2010 and 2060, providing an 
assessment of the probable effects that 50 years of population growth, land-use change, 
water-use change, and climate change may have on the region’s municipal water supply 
system benefits and agricultural productivity.  The essay proceeds with a presentation of 
the model, including descriptions of the economic, hydrologic, institutional, and 
dynamic components.  The model description is followed by a presentation and 
discussion of the results from several scenarios.  A summary of results and implications 
comprises the final section. 
4.2  Model Description 
The hydroeconomic model is an optimization program, constructed and solved in 
the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS)™ (GAMS Development Corporation 
2011).  The objective of model application is to maximize social gains across the 
agricultural and urban sectors.  Controls imbedded in the model include the choices of 
crops, acreages, farming practice (irrigated or dryland), and municipal water supply 
technologies.  Optimization is subject to several hydrologic and institutional constraints 
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designed to represent the conditions found in the Valley.  A variety of literature sources 
and discussions with local experts were consulted in the attempt to build a model that 
reasonably represents the Valley’s hydrologic, institutional, and economic environment 
(Hinojosa 2009; Leidner et al. 2011b; Thompson 1999; TWDB 2007, 2009; 
Yarrito 2009). 
Objective Function 
The objective function maximizes the net benefits of agricultural production and 
municipal consumers’ consumption of water.  The source of agricultural water is from 
River water that is transported from diversion points along the River, but is otherwise 
untreated.  Municipal water use can come from treated River water, brackish 
groundwater treated by reverse osmosis desalination, or seawater (available only in 
coastal Cameron County) also treated by reverse osmosis desalination.  The benefits that 
accrue to the agricultural sector are calculated from the revenue of crops, less the costs 
of production.  Municipal water-consumption benefits are calculated as the area under a 
projected linear demand curve, less the costs of water treatment.  The maximized 
objective function is as follows: 
 
∑ ∑ ∑ ,,	

, − 	,  
−		,  
+∑  ∑ ,,


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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 −∑ 
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
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
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
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 −

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−	

,,


	
	  
−∑ 

ℎ,

 .    (4.1) 
The objective function sums across all counties in , where  ∈ (, 
	 
,!
).  Agricultural net returns (benefits) are total revenue minus costs 
per acre, multiplied by the number of acres employed in growing crop 
, where 
 ∈
(, 	ℎ", , "	, 
, ##, 
", "	); and 
using farming practice 	, where 	 ∈ (

, ).  In the model, only cotton 
and sorghum produce positive net returns under dryland or no irrigation.  The final cost 
term in the agricultural benefits component of the objective function is the cost of 
expanding agricultural practices, or where 	 = 

, 		, 
represents the per acre cost of expanding irrigated acreages into dryland acreages; and 
where 	 = , 		, represents the per acre cost of expanding 
dryland acreage into ranchland.  The expansion of dryland and irrigated acreages are 
allowed only in the model year 2060 scenarios. 
The benefits of water consumption ,,


 are summed across seasons  ∈ 
$	
, ", %, 
&.  Seasonal consumer surplus comes from integrating 
over a demand curve $∙& (Appendix F), which takes as an input the total quantity of 
municipal water from all possible types of water treatment systems, 
∑ ,





 , where  ∈ $'
	"%	, 
"	

, 	

&.  The cost components for the 
municipal sector include a per unit treatment cost 


 and a per unit 
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water transaction cost, 
, by type of transfer where % ∈
(, , "
).  A water lease, as considered in this study, is a temporary 
(single-year) transfer of a water right entitlement.  A sale is the permanent transaction of 
a water right in the water market.  An exclusion is a water right transaction that is 
explicitly linked to the transaction of land which has been under the purview of an 
irrigation district.  When such land is transacted, the land and its associated water rights 
are excluded from the district.  The use of conventionally-treated surface waters from the 
Rio Grande also incurs an opportunity cost, 	

, equal to the market price of a 
Falcon-Amistad water right. 
Land Use 
Land use for each county can either be urban or agricultural, with agricultural 
land subdivided into land employed in either irrigated or dryland agricultural practices.  
In the 2010 model year, the acreages of each land-use type are constrained to be less 
than or equal to recorded levels (i.e., "#())))))))))))))), *())))))))))), and ())))))))))))).  
Throughout the model description when there is potential for ambiguity, parameter 
values that are taken from literature (and not determined endogenously in the model) are 
indicated as having a fixed value with a bar over the top of the variable name. 
"#+ = "#())))))))))))))) + ,#+, ∀	.   (4.2) 
,#+ = ∑ '++, , ∀	.   (4.3)  
∑ ,, ≤ *())))))))))) − '++, + -+, ∀	 and 
  where = 


.       (4.4) 
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∑ ,, ≤ ()))))))))))) − '++, + +, ∀	 and 
  where 	 = .       (4.5) 
In the model year 2060 scenarios, land use is allowed to change, with new urban 
land represented by ,#+.   New urban acreages are the result of 
converting either irrigated agricultural land ('++,
) or 
dryland acreages ('++,).  The agricultural sector may in turn 
expand either irrigated acreage (-+) or dryland agricultural acreage 
(+), within the constraints of water availability and land. 
Crop Acreage Choice 
The crop choice in the model is subject to several constraints that ensure model 
application behaves according to documented, historical behavior in the Valley, called 
flexibility constraints.  Optimized acreages of each crop in each county, ,,, are 
held equal to or below the acreages reported in the Census of Agriculture (USDA-NASS 
2010), )))))),,, inflated by an exogenously imposed technology adoption rate, ., that 
increases in the model year, .  In this way, model year 2060 scenarios are allowed 
greater levels of all crop types (but total acreage is still constrained by equations 4.4 and 
4.5).  Therefore, a reasonable expectation for the model’s behavior is for higher-valued 
crops to be employed over a greater portion of farmland in model year 2060 than 
occurring in 2010. 
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,, ≤ )))))),, ∗ (1 + .),	∀	,	where 	 = 

, and where 
 ∈
(, 	ℎ", , "	, 
, ##, 
",	 
   "	).     (4.6) 
For the model’s two dryland crops, cotton and sorghum, the crop choice 
constraints are more complicated.  To accommodate modeling the full effects of a 
drought, model acreages associated with the Valley’s historically vast tracts of irrigated 
farmland must be convertible to dryland practices.  For this reason, the model’s dryland 
cotton and dryland sorghum acreages are only constrained to be in the same ratio as 
previous years, which is also inflated by a technology adoption rate, ..  This requisite 
ratio preserves the common practice of periodically rotating farmland out of cotton 
production, which is thought to maintain soil productivity (Bullock 1992). 
,,
,	
,
≤
,,
,	
,
∗ (1 + .), ∀	, where 	 = , and   
  where 
 ∈ (, ℎ").     (4.7) 
Irrigation Water Use and Conveyance Loss 
On-farm water consumption is defined as the product of per acre water use by 
crop, /,, and the number of irrigated acres associated with each crop, 
,,.  The on-farm water use is summed across all crops in each county and then 
added to the specific county’s conveyance losses.  A loss rate, '(, is 
multiplied by the county’s irrigated acres.  The on-farm water use and the conveyance 
losses (for both agricultural and municipal water distribution) must be less than or equal 
to the water available in each county’s agricultural water account (equation 4.8).   This 
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stipulation implicitly accounts for the irrigation system infrastructure being used to 
supply urban water users and agriculture incurring conveyance losses related to urban 
water. 
 
∑ ,,/, + ∑ ,, '(     
  +	"#+'( ≤ !, ∀	         
  and where 	 = 

.      (4.8) 
Allocation of Irrigation Water from Rio Grande 
The model allocates River water into the accounts of each of the county’s 
irrigation agents according to the following formula. 
  0
% − ∑ ∑ ,,


 − '1 = !, ∀	, and  
 where  = '
	 "%	.  (4.9) 
The term in the parentheses is the total useable agricultural inflows for the 
region, which is the annual total reservoir inflows for all human uses, 
%, less the 
portion that is used by the municipal sectors, ∑ ∑ ,,


 , and less the annual 
amount (if any) apportioned for environmental flows, '1. The region’s total 
useable agricultural inflows are divided into county-level allocations based on the 
portion of total agriculture water rights held within each county, which is represented by 
0. 
Allocation of Municipal Water from Rio Grande 
Two equations constrain the amount of water that is useable by the model’s 
municipal sector.  Each equation is activated based on the availability of reservoir 
inflows for municipal uses.  The first equation is associated with reservoir inflow levels 
97 
 
 
that are in excess of the municipal sector’s legal allocation of River water (equation 
4.10).  In this “non-drought” case, a county’s annual conventionally-treated water 
supplies (∑ ,,


 ) are less than or equal to the number of that county’s owned 
water rights (,	) plus any additional rights acquired through transfers 
(∑ ,

 ).  The next constraint (equation 4.11) is associated with severe 
drought-level inflows, whereby reservoir inflows fall below the legal entitlement of the 
municipal sectors.  In such a drought scenario, no agricultural sector receives any water, 
and the municipal sectors of each county are allocated water based on the portion of 
municipal rights owned in each county. 
∑ ,,


 ≤ ,	 + ∑ ,

 , ∀	, and   
  where  = '
 "%	.  (4.10) 
∑ ,,


 ≤ 2$
%&− "#+, ∀	,  
  and where  = '
	"%	.  (4.11) 
In selected drought scenarios in the model application, if reservoir inflows are 
insufficient to supply each municipal agent’s legal entitlement to water, then equation 
4.11 is activated with equation 4.10 ignored.  In this case, the municipal agents must 
divide the flows between them according to each agent’s portion of water rights owned, 
2, while also being charged for any conveyance losses in the municipal distribution 
network, .  In non-drought scenarios, conveyance losses for both urban and 
agricultural reduce agricultural water accounts.   
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Conveyance Loss Rates 
Conveyance losses included in the model for the agricultural sector are 
represented as a weighted average of lined and unlined irrigation canal seepage rates per 
mile of canal (  and , weighted by 3).  This loss rate per 
mile of irrigation canal, , is multiplied by the density of canal miles per 
acre of irrigated farmland (
4++).  The equations that govern conveyance 
losses for agriculture are as follows: 
 = 3 + $1 − 3&,  (4.12) 
'( = 
4++ ∗ ∑ ,, , ∀	 and 
  where = 


.       (4.13) 
The other conveyance loss term used in the model represents per acre 
conveyance losses of waters that are distributed through the urban sector, .  
This value is directly calculated from previous studies of the Valley’s water distribution 
system seepage losses ('())))))))))))))))))))))
	
), the model application estimation of 
agricultural-related seepage losses ('(), and urban acreage 
("#()))))))))))))))) (equation 4.14).  
  =
				


.   (4.14) 
Groundwater 
Since the majority of Valley groundwater is in the primarily brackish Gulf Coast 
Aquifer (Chowdhury and Mace 2007), the availability of groundwater for irrigation 
purposes is assumed to be negligible.  Apart from the Gulf Coast Aquifer, the only other 
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tabulated source of groundwater for the three-county region of interest to this study is 
found in Hidalgo County (NRS 2010a), which identifies 10,000 acre feet in “other 
aquifers”, which includes primarily the Rio Grande Alluvium.  By way of comparison, 
for the three-county region, where the “other aquifers” contain 10,000 acre feet, the Gulf 
Coast Aquifer and surface water yields from the River amount to almost 0.25 million 
and 1.9 million acre feet, respectively (NRS 2010a).  Building on the assumption that the 
Gulf Coast Aquifer contains mostly brackish water, desalination is the technology 
required to put Gulf Coast Aquifer to use in the municipal sector.  The extraction and 
production capacities of brackish groundwater for municipal purposes are limited by the 
estimated physical scarcity of the groundwater resource. 
∑ ,,


 ≤ 	5, ∀	 and where  = "
  	

.       (4.15) 
Since brackish groundwater is a relatively-innovative water supply technology 
when compared to conventional surface water treatment, an additional institutional 
constraint is placed on the development of brackish groundwater desalination facilities, 
whereby a county’s treatment capacity is linked to the county’s in situ desalination 
activities prior to 2010.   Following a similar constraint on crop choice (equation 4.6), 
the municipal water produced from brackish desalination of groundwater, 
∑ ,,


 , cannot exceed the production level established between 2000 and 
2010, ,


, inflated by a technology adoption rate, 6. 
 
∑ ,,


 ≤ ,


 ∗ (1 + 6),	∀	 and where  =  
  "	

.     (4.16) 
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Seawater 
Allowed in the model is seawater desalination in Cameron County, but not 
Willacy or Hidalgo Counties.  In terms of physical scarcity, no limit is placed on 
seawater desalination.  While potential water supplies from seawater are physically vast, 
the economic potential of the resource is limited by the costs associated with seawater 
desalination production technologies.  The cost of seawater desalination technology is 
relatively greater than either of the other two alternatives (i.e., conventional surface 
water or brackish groundwater desalination).  Energy and capital required to treat 
relatively more saline seawater contribute to the higher costs associated with seawater 
desalination (Leidner et al. 2011a). 
Urban Water Use 
The value to consumers of urban water use is estimated by calculating consumer 
surplus under a demand curve in the objective function.  Additionally, the model 
imposes minimum per capita water consumption levels.   
∑ ,,


 ≥ 		"
		
,.     (4.17) 
Population Growth and Land-use Change 
Population growth affects the model in two direct ways.  First, population growth 
increases municipal water consumption, which is represented by increasing the 
		"
 in equation 4.17.  Secondly, population growth expands urban boundaries 
into agricultural land, which reduces land available for agricultural production and, by a 
process known as exclusion, reduces water available for agricultural irrigation by 
transferring excluded water rights to the municipal sector. 
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,#+ = 	
	 	!
.      (4.18) 
,#+ = ∑ '++, , ∀	, 	.    (4.19) 
,
 = '++,, where	% = "
 and 	 = 
  

.        (4.20) 
In the model, the amount of acreage that is converted from agricultural use to 
urban use in each county is the anticipated change in total population Δ		"
 
divided by the density of the new population, "#4	
.  These newly-converted 
acres, ,#+, diminish the county’s acreages in irrigated or dryland 
agriculture.  A relevant assumption made in the model is that new urban acres initially 
expand into irrigated farmland and then followed by expansion into dryland acreages. 
As a consequence of converting irrigated acres to urban acres, represented by 
'++, where 	 = 

, a transfer of the Falcon-Amistad water 
rights associated with those formerly irrigated acreages occurs from the irrigation agent 
to the municipal agent.  In the Valley, irrigated agricultural land that is developed into 
urban or municipal tracts constitutes those acreages being excluded from the irrigation 
district’s purview; therefore, these types of water transfers are called transfers by 
exclusion (as opposed to strictly market-based water rights transfers).  In either the case 
of exclusion or a market transfer, irrigation water rights are converted to municipal 
rights at a rate of two to one, which is a simplification of the actual transfer process 
described more completely by Leidner et al. (2011b). 
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Climate Change 
For selected model year 2060 scenarios, climate change adjustments are made to 
crop yields and crop water usages, where the yields and water requirements under 
climate change (i.e., 
,,  and /, )  are a function of the 2010 yields and 
water requirements (used in equations 4.1 and 4.8) multiplied by a proportional change 
(i.e., 7,,, 7,
) due to changing climate. 

,, = 
, ∗ (1 + 7,,) , ∀	
, 	, .    (4.21) 
/, = / ∗ (1 + 7,
) ∀	
, .    (4.22) 
Yield effects associated with climate change are included for all crops under both 
irrigated and dryland practices.  Changes in water use are only included for the irrigated 
crops.  The availability of water across the entire system, specifically inflows into the 
Falcon-Amistad system, may also change as a result of climate change.  This possibility 
is modeled by adjusting the inflow levels into the River system as follows: 

% = 
% ∗ (1 + 7	).      (4.23) 
where, as with equations 4.21 and 4.22, the climate-change-influenced parameter is the 
product of the original parameter (used in equation 4.11) and a proportional change, 
7	. 
4.3 Data Description and Empirical Parameterization 
Data used to parameterize the model are found in a variety of sources, including 
extension publications, regional and state water planning documents, published 
academic literature, and personal communications with engineers and water planners in 
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the Valley.  Many of these parameters are described more completely throughout this 
document, where Table 4-1 is a guide to the locations of those descriptions and more 
information on the parameterization.  A few components in Table 4-1, such as the 
assumed price of irrigated farmland ($15,000/acre) and the price of a water right 
($2,218/af) do not have representation in the model per se.  These prices are used to 
calculate wealth trends for the model following the optimization step.  The term ‘relic’ 
refers to values found in the literature, which serve as an anchor to the values selected 
for the model, e.g., the use of "#())))))))))))))). 
Table 4-1. Summary of selected parameters for the hydroeconomic model of 
Cameron, Hidalgo, and Willacy counties in Texas. 
Description   Notation Unit Citation / More Details 
Crop prices  $/unit Appendix G 
Crop yields per acre , unit/acre Appendix G 
Crop production costs per 
acre 
	
, $/acre Appendix G 
Water right price N/A $/acre foot Leidner et al. 2011b 
Agriculture land price N/A $/acre User defined 
Water treatment costs 	
 $/acre foot Table 4-6 
Urban water distribution 
cost 
	
	
 $/acre foot Appendix I 
Water market transaction 
costs 
	

 $/acre foot User defined 
Relic urban acreage  acres Leigh et al. 2008 
Relic irrigated acreage  acres Table 4-2 
Relic dryland acreage  acres Table 4-2 
Relic crop acreages  ,, acres Table 4-2 
Crop adoption rate   rate/year User defined 
Crop water usage , acre feet/acre Table 3, Appendix H  
Reservoir inflows 	 acre feet/year Calculated from TCEQ 
2009a 
Environmental flows 	 acre feet/year User defined 
Agricultural inflow shares  portion Calculated from TCEQ 
2009a 
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Table 4-1 continued. 
Description   Notation Unit Citation / More Details 
Owned municipal water 
rights 
,	 acre feet/year NRS 2010b 
Seepage loss in lined canal 	

	 acre 
feet/mile/year 
Leigh and Fipps 2011 
Seepage loss in unlined 
canal 
	

	 acre 
feet/mile/year 
Karimov et al. 2009 
Portion of lined canals 	 portion Based on Fipps 2000 
Total conveyance losses 		

 acre feet/year Based on Fipps 2000 
Canal miles per irrigated 
acre 

 mile/acre Appendix J 
Municipal inflow shares    portion Calculated from NRS 
2010b 
Relic brackish desalination !,
 acre feet/year NRS 2010b 
Brackish desalination 
adoption rate 
" rate/year User defined 
Population level 		 persons NRS 2010a 
Per capital water use #$
 acre feet/year Based on Thompson 1999 
Population growth Δ		 persons NRS 2010a 
Crop yield climate change 
effect 
%,,
	
 
portion Beach et al. 2009 
Crop water use climate 
change effect 
%,

 
portion Beach et al. 2009 
Reservoir inflow climate 
change effect 
%

 
portion Based on Chen et al. 2001 
    
Source(s): Beach et al. (2009); Boyer et al. (2010); Chen et al. (2001); Fipps (2000); 
Karimov et al. (2009); Leigh et al. (2009); Leigh and Fipps (2011); NRS (2010a, 2010b, 
2010c); Thompson (1999). 
 
 
4.4  Model Year 2010 Results 
Results from model application for 2010 are presented in this section.  These 
results primarily serve as validation that the model behaves reasonably with respect to 
expectations and previously published records regarding the agricultural and municipal 
water use for this three-county region (Cameron, Hidalgo, and Willacy counties) of 
south Texas. 
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Agricultural Sector 
Displayed in Table 4-2 are 2010 baseline agricultural acreages alongside the 
values from the Census of Agriculture (USDA-NASS 2010).  Crop acreage changes are 
in the direction of higher-valued crops.  The only crop acreages decreasing are irrigated 
and dryland sorghum, which have the lowest per acre returns among both irrigated and 
dryland crops.  The acreages of the more profitable crops are increasing within the 
confines of the assumed rate of new technology adoption. Dryland acreage expands 
overall for Cameron and Hidalgo counties due to the nature of the crop choice constraint 
on cotton and sorghum.  The results in the right three columns of Table 4-2 represent 
proportional changes of model acreages as compared to acreages documented in the 
Census of Agriculture (USDA-NASS 2010).  These proportional changes are 
qualitatively the same as percentage changes, where 0.05 equals 5%.  Notice that 
acreages from the model are not more than 0.05 more than documented acreages, except 
for dryland acreages of cotton and sorghum in Hidalgo County.  This occurrence is due 
to dryland acreages being constrained by the ratio of cotton to sorghum (equation 4.7), 
instead of the actual acreages as with the other crops (equation 4.6). 
 Water use in the agricultural sector for the 2010 model year is summarized in 
Table 4-3.  On-farm water usage as well as seepage losses are displayed with seepage 
losses accounting for 0.22 of the total agricultural water use.  This result assumes that 
exactly one-half of the irrigation distribution network uses lined canals and the other half 
uses unlined canals, which corresponds to the range of lined and unlined canals 
identified by Fipps (2000).   
  
 
Table 4-2. Cropping acreage (in 1,000s of acres) for a three-county region (Cameron, Hidalgo, and Willacy) in 
Texas, a comparison between Census of Agriculture data in 2007 and the 2010 model year. 
Census of Agriculture 2007 Hydroeconomic Model 2010 
Modeled proportional 
changes in acreage 
County County County 
  Crops Cameron Hidalgo Willacy Cameron Hidalgo Willacy Cameron Hidalgo Willacy 
D
r
y
 Cotton 16.45 3.36 41.20 17.20 3.75 42.78 0.05 0.12 0.04 
Sorghum 63.25 111.81 96.17 62.97 118.99 95.10 0.00 0.06 -0.01 
I
r
r
i
g
a
t
e
d
 
Cotton 9.71 14.86 3.30 10.20 15.60 3.47 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Sorghum 51.29 57.82 8.91 50.18 53.28 8.74 -0.02 -0.08 -0.02 
Corn 0.00 15.56 0.00 0.00 16.34 0.00 n/a 0.05 n/a 
Cantaloupea 0.24 1.01 0.00 0.25 1.06 0.00 0.05 0.05 n/a 
Oniona 0.79 7.56 0.00 0.83 7.93 0.00 0.05 0.05 n/a 
Cabbagea 0.92 2.70 0.00 0.97 2.84 0.00 0.05 0.05 n/a 
Citrusa 2.56 24.79 0.05 2.68 26.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 
Sugar Canea 8.07 24.39 0.14 8.48 25.61 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 
All Irrigated 73.59 148.69 12.40 73.59 148.69 12.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
All Dryland 79.70 115.17 137.36 80.17 122.74 137.87 0.01 0.07 0.00 
 
All Cropland 153.29 263.86 149.76 153.75 271.43 150.27 0.00 0.03 0.00 
 Source(s): USDA-NASS (2010) and modeling results. 
a.
 For the Census of Agriculture, all reported acres are assumed to be irrigated.    
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Many of the vegetable and fruit crops, such as cantaloupe, onion, and cabbage, 
have lower per acre on-farm water use than cotton or sorghum.  The crop budgets 
(Extension Agricultural Economics 2011) assume that the high-value fruit and vegetable 
crops are grown using drip irrigation systems as compared to furrow irrigation.  Furrow 
irrigation is assumed for cotton, sorghum, citrus, and sugar cane.  Sugar cane and 
sorghum are associated with a majority of all irrigation water use (164 and 162 thousand 
acre feet, respectively). 
Table 4-3. Summary of agricultural sector water use (in 1,000s of acre feet) for a 
modeled three-county region (Cameron, Hidalgo, and Willacy counties) in Texas in 
model year 2010. 
Annual On-Farm Water Use Summary 
  Model Results 
Irrigated Crops 
Per Acre Water 
Use (acre-feet) 
1,000s 
Irrigated Acres 
On-Farm Water Use 
(1,000s acre-feet) 
Cotton 1.72 29.27 50.34 
Sorghum 1.44 112.19 161.55 
Corn 1.85 16.34 30.23 
Cantaloupe 1.20 1.31 1.57 
Onion 1.07 8.77 9.38 
Cabbage 1.29 3.81 4.91 
Citrus 3.19 28.76 91.76 
Sugar Cane 4.79 34.23 163.98 
Totals 234.68 513.72 
Agricultural Sector Water Use Totals 
Use Category Water Use (1,000 acre-feet) Portions 
Total On-Farm Use 513.72 0.78 
Seepage Loss 146.14 0.22 
Total Agricultural Use 659.86 1.00 
Source(s): Extension Agricultural Economics (2011) and modeling results. 
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Municipal Sector 
Model results for the use of water in the municipal sectors are presented in Table 
4-4.  Water use through the year follows a seasonal pattern where use in the growing 
seasons of spring and summer that during exceed the fall and winter.  This seasonality in 
municipal water demand has been established in the literature (Griffin and Chang 1991). 
Table 4-4.  Summary of municipal sector water use by season (in 1,000s of acre 
feet) for a modeled three-county region (Cameron, Hidalgo, and Willacy counties) 
in Texas in model year 2010. 
County Region 
Season Cameron Hidalgo Willacy Totals Portions 
Spring 23.36 30.67 0.90 54.93 0.25 
Summer 23.40 42.73 1.25 67.38 0.31 
Fall 18.95 32.75 0.96 52.66 0.24 
Winter 17.82 25.70 0.75 44.28 0.20 
Annual 83.53 131.86 3.87 219.25 1.00 
 
The Falcon-Amistad water rights system and the conventional treatment of 
surface water diverted from the Rio Grande comprise a large portion, 0.91, of regional 
municipal water supplies, with brackish groundwater desalination comprising or 
contributing the remaining 0.09 (Table 4-5).  In model year 2010, only the Willacy 
County municipal agent was projected to purchase leased water to meet urban water use 
requirements.  Such leasing is possible due to the “extra” water rights owned by 
municipal agents in Cameron and Hidalgo.  The Cameron County municipal agent owns 
nearly twice the number of water rights than are typically used each year.  This result is 
similar to findings in Leidner et al. (2011b), where municipal rights holders possessed 
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many more water rights than used annually, presumably to prepare for the anticipated 
rapid levels of population growth along the US-Mexico border.  For the entire three-
county region in model year 2010, conventionally treated water, both owned and leased, 
accounted for approximately 0.72 of the region’s total municipal water right ownership 
being utilized. 
Table 4-5. Summary of municipal sector water use by water treatment method 
(in 1,000s of acre feet) for a modeled three-county region (Cameron, Hidalgo, and 
Willacy counties) in Texas in model year 2010. 
County Region 
Treatment Method Cameron Hidalgo Willacy Totals Portions 
Conventional produceda 72.61 125.14 2.75 200.49 0.91 
Brackish produced 10.92 6.72 1.12 18.76 0.09 
Brackish capacityb 10.92 6.72 1.12 18.76 
Rio Grande/Falcon Amistad Water Rights     
Owneda 135.17 144.53 1.00 280.71 1.00 
Used 72.61 125.14 1.00 200.49 0.71 
Leased 1.75 1.75 0.01 
 a
 The amount of municipal that can be produced by conventional water treatment is only 
limited by the availability of water rights. 
b
 Brackish capacity and the amount of water rights owned by each county are taken from 
the Region M water plan (NRS 2010c). 
Hidalgo County has the greatest use of municipal water use of 132 thousand acre 
feet followed by Cameron County at 84 thousand acre feet.  Willacy County is located to 
the north with a limited urban population and only uses 3.9 thousand acre feet of 
municipal water.  Future population growth is expected to be especially strong in 
Cameron and Hidalgo counties (NRS 2010b). 
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A summary of municipal water supply costs are presented in Table 4-6.  Across 
the modeled three counties, the total estimated cost for the ownership, treatment, and the 
delivery of municipal water is more than $150 million for 2010.  The largest component 
of municipal supply system costs is the conventional treatment of water diverted from 
the Rio Grande at 0.70 of total cost.  The ownership costs of water rights associated with 
the Rio Grande or the Falcon-Amistad water market constitute the second-largest 
component of the municipal water system costs at 0.20 of total cost.  The desalination of 
groundwater and distribution constitute smaller amounts of total system costs.  No cost 
is incurred from seawater desalination because that water treatment technology does not 
enter the 2010 solution during optimization.  Seawater desalination has a substantially 
higher per-unit cost of production, approximately double that of the other two municipal 
water treatment alternatives (Table 4-6). 
Consumer Benefits and Returns to Agricultural Production 
The benefits to urban consumers from urban water supply systems exceeds by 
almost double the estimated costs of urban water supply.   In Table 4-7, the results for 
model year 2010 are presented alongside the results for the baseline for model year 
2060.  Additional 2060 scenarios are investigated in later sections.  The consumer 
benefits double from 2010 to 2060 because the population in the region is presumed to 
more than double.  From 2010 to 2060, the agricultural sector receives revenue from 
land and water sales.  Interestingly, despite selling tracts of land and water rights over 50 
years to the urban sector, returns to agricultural production also increase over the 50- 
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Table 4-6. Summary of municipal sector water system costs for a modeled 
three-county region (Cameron, Hidalgo, and Willacy counties) in Texas in model 
year 2010.  
    Model Results 
Water Service Cost Type 
Per Unit 
Cost ($ 
Per Acre-
Foot) 
Quantity           
(1,000 
Acre-Feet) 
Total Cost 
($1,000s) 
Portions 
of Total 
Cost 
Water Treatment Methods   
Conventional Treatment 525 200.49 105,226 0.63 
Brackish Groundwater Desalination 665 18.76 12,483 0.07 
Seawater Desalination 1,340 0.00 0 0.00 
     
Others Costs   
Falcon-Amistad Water Rights 
Ownership (average annual) 143 207.33 29,649 0.18 
Distribution 91 219.25 19,864 0.02 
Totals   219.25 167,222 1.00 
 
Table 4-7. Summary of benefit and cost measurements (in $100,000s) in the 
municipal and agricultural sectors for a modeled three-county region (Cameron, 
Hidalgo, and Willacy counties) in Texas in model year 2010 and 2060. 
  2010 2060 
Annual Benefits and Costs     
Urban Consumer Benefits 2,738 6,172 
Urban Water Treatment Costs 1,662 3,604 
Net Urban Consumer Surplus 1,075 2,567 
Returns to agricultural production 4,007 5,302 
Cumulative Revenues     
Water right sales revenue 0 320 
Land sales revenue 0 3,371 
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year period.  This increase in agricultural profitability is due to the relaxation of the crop 
choice constraints (equations 6 and 7), allowing for acres of higher-valued crops to 
expand across the three-county region. 
4.5 Model Year 2060 Results 
To provide further insight on implications for 2060, various scenarios are 
imposed on the model and those results are presented in this section.  The scenarios are 
characterized by different assumptions regarding the expected pattern of land-use 
changes, institutional changes, and the potential effects of climate change.  Presented 
first are the land-use change and institutional scenarios, followed by several climate 
change scenarios.  
Population Growth and Land-use Change 
Each scenario for 2060 is associated with a set of assumptions regarding urban 
population density, the adoption of brackish groundwater desalination technology, legal 
institutions relevant to the price of excluded water rights, and climate.  The scenarios 
and their assumptions, and their selection are discussed below.  Selected results from the 
2060 scenarios are presented in Table 4-8 and Table 4-9. 
Baseline 2060.  The Baseline 2060 scenario is used for a point of reference and 
comparison to the other model year 2060 scenarios.  The assumptions in this scenario 
include:  The density of population assigned to new urban growth is maintained at the 
2010 level, calculated from population levels found in U.S. Census (2011a; 2011b; and 
2011b) and urban land area found in Leigh, Barroso, and Fipps (2009).  The price of 
excluded water rights is fixed at the 2010 level of $2,218/af.  The technology adoption 
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rate with respect to brackish groundwater desalination is held constant at the observed 
rate that occurred between 2000 and 2010, i.e., every 10 years, municipal agents are 
allowed to replicate the brackish desalination capacity that was added between 2000 and  
Table 4-8. Summary of water- and land-use changes, municipal water supply 
sources, municipal water-system benefits and costs, and agricultural production 
levels for a modeled three-county region (Cameron, Hidalgo, and Willacy counties) 
in Texas in model year 2060. 
Scenario: 
Baseline 
2060 El Paso Laredo 
Population density: Constant at 2010 level 
New growth 
50% denser 
New growth 
500% denser 
Excluded water right price: 
2010 
Market 
Price 
2010 
Market 
Price 
2010 Market 
Price 
Maximum desalination adoption rate: Replicate / 10yrs 
Replicate / 
10yrs 
Replicate / 
10yrs 
Drought Level: None None None 
Ag water rights converted to municipal use a 
Water market (1,000s acre feet) 0 0 29 
Exclusion (1,000s acre feet) 224 206 58 
Agricultural Water Sales Revenue ($100,000) 320 294 124 
Ag Land converted to municipal use a 
From irrigated (acres) 224 206 58 
From dryland (acres) 125 26 0 
Agricultural Land Sales Revenue ($100,000) 3,371 2,247 562 
Municipal water supply sources 
Rio Grande (1,000s acre feet / year) 389 378 351 
Brackish (1,000s acre feet / year) 129 129 129 
Seawater (1,000s acre feet / year) 0 0 0 
Urban Benefits and Ag Returns ($100,000) 
Urban Consumer Benefits 6,172 6,077 5,838 
Urban Water Treatment Costs 4,244 4,132 3,941 
Net Urban Consumer Surplus 1,928 1,945 1,897 
Returns to Agricultural Production 4,982 5,137 6,068 
a
 Cumulative difference between 2010 and 2060; i.e., not an annual return. 
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2010.  Added capacity from 2000 to 2010 is found in the Regional Plan (NRS 2010b).  
Climate change effects are ignored for this scenario, so no changes to crop production or 
water availability are assumed.  Model solution levels for water supply system sources, 
land-use changes, water-use changes, and agricultural production are reported in 
Table 4-8. 
El Paso.  This scenario is named “El Paso” because the population densities of 
new municipal growth in Cameron and Hidalgo counties (Cameron and Hidalgo are the 
focus of these population density scenarios, since they are more populated than Willacy 
county) are assigned levels that are approximately equal to that of El Paso County, 
Texas.  The city of El Paso is another border and high-growth community located on the 
Rio Grande, but much farther upstream than the cities in the Valley.  El Paso, and later 
Laredo, provide natural points of comparison (i.e., ranges of potential population 
density) as to the type of population growth and urban development that may occur in 
the Valley.  Specifically, new municipal growth in all of the three counties is assumed to 
be 50% denser in this scenario than the level in 2010.  Apart from population density, 
this scenario is the same as the baseline, using $2,218/acre foot for the exclusion water 
right price; the prior assumed replication speed of new desalination capacity; and no 
climate change effects.  Compared to the baseline, fewer acres are converted from 
agriculture to urban and less acre feet of water are taken by exclusion.  Benefits to urban 
consumers and production returns to agriculture increase slightly, but the projected 
changes are not dramatic (Table 4-8). 
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Laredo.  This scenario assumes new population density is similar to that of Webb 
County, Texas, i.e., location of the City of Laredo.  Webb County is far denser than El 
Paso or any of the Valley counties; the result is new Valley urban density is set at 500% 
the 2010 levels for this scenario.  As with the El Paso scenario, all other institutional and 
climatic constraints remain the same as they are in the 2060 Baseline.  Results for this 
scenario (Table 4-8) indicate that with denser population growth, less agricultural land is 
converted to urban land.  This reduces the amount of water rights acquired by 
municipalities through the process of exclusion.  With fewer excluded rights obtained, 
the municipalities are forced toward the water market to obtain additional water rights.  
Since less agricultural land is converted to urban, agricultural returns to production for 
the region increases.  The agricultural sector also does not receive as many returns from 
the sale of land and water. 
BD-Fast.  This scenario assumes baseline levels of population density and 
exclusion water right price, but allows for faster adoption of brackish desalination 
(i.e., BD-Fast).  Specifically, brackish desalination capacity is allowed to expand at a 
rate that doubles the 2000-2010 capacity every 10 years.  The cost of conventional water 
treatment added to the ownership cost of River water is slightly higher than the cost of 
brackish groundwater desalination (which has no associated ownership cost).  
Additionally, River water that is not converted to municipal use can still be used to 
produce returns in irrigated agriculture.  For those two reasons, the model prefers 
brackish groundwater as a source of municipal supplies to conventional surface water.   
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This scenario explores the benefits of substituting groundwater for surface water in the 
region.  Apart from the adoption of brackish desalination technology, all assumptions are 
the same as in Baseline 2060. 
 Results for this scenario are found in Table 4-9, where the amount of acre feet of 
municipal treated water produced from brackish groundwater increases to 163 thousand 
acre feet per year from the baseline level of 129 thousand acre feet per year.  This 
increase is offset by a decrease in the acre feet produced by conventional water 
treatment.  Water-use changes, land-use changes, and agricultural productivity all remain 
at the same levels as the Baseline 2060 case. 
SB3.  Scenario SB3, which is shorthand for Senate Bill Three (Texas Legislature 
Online 2011), imposes a recent institutional modification to the exchange of land and 
water between municipalities and irrigation districts.  This bill grants Valley 
municipalities the right to petition the purchase of excluded water rights at a modified 
price equal to 68% of the price posted by the Rio Grande Regional River Authority 
(2011).  Theoretical analysis by Yow (2008) suggests that, on the margin, such a policy 
would result in a comparative advantage windfall accruing to the treatment of surface 
water via conventional water treatment.  In this model, such an advantage would 
manifest itself in the substitution away from brackish groundwater desalination and into 
more conventional surface water treatment of municipal waters.  This scenario tests 
these theoretical findings within a slightly-more empirical context than pursued by Yow 
(2008).   
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Table 4-9. Summary of water- and land-use changes, municipal water supply 
sources, municipal water-system benefits and costs, and agricultural production 
levels for a modeled three-county region (Cameron, Hidalgo, and Willacy counties) 
in Texas in model year 2060. 
Scenario: BD-Fasta SB3b Avg 
Population density: Constant at 2010 level 
Constant at 
2010 level 
Constant at 
2010 level 
Excluded water right price: 2010 Market 
Price 
68% of 2010 
Market Price 
2010 Market 
Price 
Maximum desalination adoption rate: Double / 10 yrs 
Double / 10 
yrs 
Replicate / 
10yrs 
Drought Level: None None 35% 
Ag water rights converted to municipal use c 
Water market (1,000s acre feet) 0 0 0 
Exclusion (1,000s acre feet) 224 224 224 
Agricultural Water Sales Revenue ($100,000) 320 217 320 
Ag Land converted to municipal use c 
From irrigated (acres) 224 224 224 
From dryland (acres) 125 125 125 
Agricultural Land Sales Revenue ($100,000) 3,371 3,371 3,371 
Municipal water supply sources 
Rio Grande (1,000s acre feet / year) 355 355 360 
Brackish (1,000s acre feet / year) 163 163 129 
Seawater (1,000s acre feet / year) 0 0 11 
Urban Benefits and Ag Returns ($100,000) 
Urban Consumer Benefits 6,172 6,172 6,015 
Urban Water Treatment Costs 4,243 4,140 4,183 
Net Urban Consumer Surplus 1,929 2,031 1,832 
Returns to Agricultural Production 4,982 4,982 3,503 
a
 Brackish desalination capacity can expand rapidly. 
b
 Senate Bill Three water prices assumed. 
c
 Cumulative difference between 2010 and 2060; i.e., not an annual return. 
To ensure that any technology substitution that can occur (between conventional 
surface treatment and brackish groundwater treatment) will occur during the 
optimization of the model, this scenario adopts the rapid rate of technology adoption of 
brackish groundwater used in the BD-Fast scenario.  In the same vein, population 
118 
 
 
density is maintained at 2010 levels.  This level of population density imposes a high 
(relative to the El Paso and Laredo scenarios) level of land-use change from agriculture 
to municipal, so that municipalities will obtain the highest amount of excluded water 
rights to use in their supply system.  The results for this scenario (Table 4-9) indicate 
that little substitution away from brackish desalination occurs in the model.  One clear 
finding from the reduction in the price of an excluded water right is that agricultural 
revenues from excluded water rights sales decrease from the baseline. 
Climate Change.  The scenario referred to as Avg presents results from a model 
run that averages crop water use and crop production effects for four climate change 
models.  Subsequent sections discuss climate change results in greater detail.  In addition 
to crop production effects, the Avg climate scenario presented in Table 4-9 imposes a 
35% reduction in available reservoir inflows.  The climate effects reduce yields on 
dryland cotton and sorghum production, such that dryland agriculture is abandoned in 
the region.  The reduction in inflows makes the remaining irrigated acreages composed 
entirely of high-value citrus, vegetables, and sugar cane, which now have greater yields 
and increased profitability under this climate scenario (relative to profitability without 
imposing climate effects).  The greater value of these, already high-value, crops make 
the sale of additional water rights to the urban sector sub-optimal.  For this reason, the 
model chooses to introduce an (admittedly small) amount of seawater desalination into 
the optimal portfolio of municipal water supplies. 
An additional model-run scenario, which is not presented in the Tables 4-8 or 4-
9, restricts the flexibility constraints on crop acreage selection (equation 4.6) so that the 
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maximum acres of high-value crops (vegetables, sugar cane, and citrus) are equal to the 
level in the Baseline 2010 scenario presented in Table 4-2.  One argument for 
maintaining maximum crop acreage levels for high-value crops at the 2007 or 2010 
level, even for 2060 scenarios, is based on the risk aversion of farmers and institutional 
limits.  This suggests farmers plant a mixture of crops to hedge against unforeseeable 
changes in prices or yields of a single crop or input (McCarl 2011).  This scenario is run 
as a robustness check on the model to examine the degree to which the modeled 
flexibility in crop shifts contributes to agricultural sector productivity.   
As may be expected, the scenario with the greater flexibility (i.e., Baseline 2060) 
contains proportionally-greater levels of higher-valued crops.  In particular, the Baseline 
2060 scenario has greater (as a portion) acreages of citrus (0.14), irrigated cotton (0.02), 
cantaloupe (0.01), onion (0.04), cabbage (0.02), sugar cane (0.001), and dryland cotton 
(0.1).  With respect to lower-valued crops, the Baseline 2060 scenario has fewer (as a 
percentage) acreages of irrigated sorghum (0.02) and dryland sorghum (0.12).  These 
crop shifts resulted in the Baseline 2060 scenario having $164 million in additional 
annual returns to agriculture (0.33 of Baseline 2060 returns) over the scenario with the 
flexibility constraints in place.  While the effect of the lack of a flexibility constraint 
allows the agricultural sector to shift the crop mix towards higher-valued crops seems 
large, accounting for approximately one-third of Baseline 2060 returns, the qualitative 
direction of results within a given scenario group (i.e., the group of land-use change 
scenarios or climate change scenarios) is likely to be unchanged, whether the flexibility 
constrain are included or not.  While the direction of these results may not change, 
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imposing the flexibility constraints may affect the magnitude of those shifts.  Sensitivity 
to different assumptions about crop choice adoption is left for future research. 
Climate Change 
This study employs four different General Circulation Models (GCMs) to give a 
range of possible future states of climate, thereby accounting for some of the uncertainty 
that is inherent when climactic conditions are forecast into the future.  The GCMs used 
here are also used by Beach et al. (2011).  These GCMs include two developed by the 
Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, denoted GFDL-CM2.0 and GFDL-CM2.1.  
This study includes another GCM developed by the Canadian Centre for Climate 
Modeling and analysis, denoted as CGCM3.1.  The final GCM used in this study was 
developed by the Meteorological Research Institute in Japan, denoted as MRI-
CGCM2.2.  Crop effects for each GCM are found in Appendix K. 
Each of these GCMs assumes a particular scenario described in the International 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) 
(Nakicenovic and Swart 2000).  The SRES scenario employed in the GCMs used in this 
study is denoted as the A1B scenario, which assumes a number of global economic 
development levels including: global population peaks mid-century and declines 
thereafter, new and more efficient technologies are readily adopted, and energy use does 
not emphasize either fossil fuels or non-fossil fuels (Beach et al. 2009).  Each GCM 
forecasts temperature and precipitation data for the south Texas region in the year 2050.  
This model assumes population growth levels for 2060, so climate forecasts for 2050 are 
not ideal.  However, this group of GCMs represents the most recently generated and 
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most up-to-date climate forecasts available.  This study assumes that the 2050 crop 
effect changes will be similar to any of the crop effects ten years later in 2060. 
Table 4-10. Summary of climate effects for the United States from several 
General Circulation Models (GCMs) used to generate climate change effects in the 
modeled three-county region (Cameron, Hidalgo, and Willacy counties) in Texas in 
model year 2060. 
GCM Season 
Change in Max 
Temp (⁰C) 
Change in Min 
Temp (⁰C) 
Change in 
Precipitation (%) 
GFDL-
CM2.0a 
Spring 2.78 2.41 -7.4 
Summer 4.34 3.44 -8.5 
GFDL-
CM2.1a 
Spring 1.66 1.72 0.6 
Summer 4.03 3.45 -16.5 
CGCM3.1b Spring 2.45 2.41 2.1 
Summer 2.27 2.17 0.7 
MRI-
CGCM2.2c 
Spring 1.23 1.37 9.5 
Summer 1.28 1.57 8.7 
Avgd Spring 2.03 1.98 1.2 
Summer 2.98 2.66 -3.9 
No GCM Spring/Summer 0.00 0.00 0.0 
Source(s): Modified from Beach et al. (2009). 
a.
 GCMs developed by Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory.  
b.
 GCM developed by Canadian Centre for Climate Modeling. 
c.
 GCM developed by Meteorological Research Institute in Japan. 
e.
 Averages the climate effects from the four other GCMs presented.   
Several relevant climatic effects for the entire US of each GCM are displayed in 
Table 4-10.  These attributes include that overall the GFDL-CM2.0 and GFDL-CM2.1 
scenarios are hotter and drier than CGCM3.1 and MRI-CGCM2.2.  All of the climate 
scenarios predict increased temperatures.  The primary difference between GFDL-
CM2.0 and GFDL-CM2.1 is their forecasted distribution of rainfall across seasons.  
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GFDL-CM2.0 forecasts rainfall changes in similar magnitudes for spring and summer 
months.  But, GFDL-CM2.1 forecasts much more severe rainfall changes for the 
summer than for the spring.  The scenario denoted Avg is an average across the other 
four scenarios. 
Figure 4-1 is an illustration of the agricultural returns to land under six different 
climate scenarios as the inflows to the Falcon-Amistad reservoirs are exogenously 
varied.  Five of the scenarios are based on GCMs described in Table 4-10.  “No GCM” 
assumes no change in crop responses to climate.  Only one scenario, GFDL-CM2.1, 
exhibits more valuable returns to agricultural land than the No GCM scenario.  In fact, 
over much of the range of the varied reservoir inflows along the x-axis of Figure 4-1, the 
GFDL-CM2.1 returns are almost double the No GCM returns.  GFDL-CM2.1 is 
characterized by relatively hotter and drier summers and milder springs than the other 
scenarios.  However, results for the other three GCM scenarios as well as the Avg 
scenario exemplify a much less prosperous future for agriculture over most of the range 
of inflow reductions (Figure 4-1).     
In all of the climate scenarios, the significance of reservoir inflows is evident.  
As soon as reservoir inflow levels decrease by approximately 0.40, the agricultural 
sector realizes decreasing returns to production, a consequence of shifting acreages from 
higher-valued irrigated crops to less-profitable dryland crops.  No recent hydrologic 
model for the lower Rio Grande basin could be identified for use in this study to estimate 
the change to reservoir inflows, or watershed flow levels, based on a particular GCM.  
However, a previous study of the south-central Texas region suggests that climate  
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Figure 4-1. Agricultural returns to production in the modeled three-county 
region (Cameron, Hidalgo, and Willacy counties) in Texas in model year 2060 
under different climate change scenarios. 
change may reduce water available to regional water storage systems in south-central 
Texas around the Edwards Aquifer on the order of 0.20 to 0.50 (Chen et al. 2001).  
Therefore, from Chen et al. (2001), the current study extrapolates that climate change 
may induce similar reductions in the water system of the neighboring lower Rio Grande 
basin.  To further ensure model results are robust and evaluated in appropriate context, 
the model is solved under a sequence of assumptions about reservoir inflow levels for 
each GCM.  The inflow reduction levels used in the model range from 0.0 to 0.5, where 
0.0 indicates no deviation from historical average annual reservoir system inflows and a 
0.5 indicates a reduction by half (or 50%) of annual reservoir system inflows. 
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4.6 Assumptions and Limitations  
This model is parameterized and solved under a multitude of assumptions for the 
region as it may be in the year 2060.  A few of the assumptions are listed below as 
caveats to an overgeneralized interpretation of the model’s results: 
• Crop, water, and land prices are held constant. 
• Crop and water production technologies (except for adoption rates) are held 
constant. 
• Ownership costs (opportunity cost of ownership) of brackish groundwater and 
seawater are assumed to be zero in 2060. 
• Crop, water treatment, water delivery, and land-use change costs are held 
constant. 
• Several smaller-acreage crops are excluded from analysis due to unavailable or 
unreliable data. 
• Per capita urban water consumption is held constant. 
• Price elasticities of water consumption are held constant. 
• Urban water consumption is not subject to temperature, precipitation, or any 
other climate-related elasticity. 
• The portion of lined and unlined canals is held constant. 
• Proxies are used for the climate effects of onions, cabbage, and cantaloupe. 
• Municipal water consumption is not a function of municipal water prices, 
including any conservation pricing schemes such as increasing block rates. 
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• If sugar cane acreages fall below 30,000 acres, the sugar mill for the region may 
not be economically viable. 
• Seawater desalination can only be used in Cameron County. 
All reasonable efforts are made to represent the hydroeconomic system of the 
Valley in the most realistic and plausible framework possible.  Nevertheless, these 
assumptions imply profound limitations on the interpretation of the model results.  The 
most reliable results include the model’s more qualitative, or relative and consistent, 
findings.  One example is that the climate change scenarios exhibit, on average, reduced 
returns to the agricultural sector relative to agriculture production in the absence of 
climate change.  Assigning a great amount of weight or significance to any specific 
quantitative finding (such as the exact level of agricultural returns under any given 
climate scenario) is not advised, in light of the assumptions and limitations listed in this 
section. 
4.7 Summary and Conclusions 
The construction and the implementation of a hydroeconomic model are 
described in this paper.  The model represents water resource management for a three-
county region in south Texas that includes Cameron, Hidalgo, and Willacy counties.  
The model is calibrated to resemble documented behavior in 2010 and then the model is 
solved under a variety of scenarios representing the year 2060.  Model year 2060 
scenarios include a variety of assumptions about land-use changes, institutions, and 
climate.  The model is generated to capture as many of the most relevant aspects of 
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Valley water management, but in many cases caveats to over-generalization of results 
are warranted.2  
The land-use scenarios are defined by different assumptions about population 
density.  In these scenarios, as population density increases, spatial expansion of urban 
lands is reduced.  This results in less land sales revenue and less revenue from excluded 
water rights accruing to the agriculture sector.  This effect becomes more apparent 
moving from the El Paso to the denser Laredo scenario.  In the Laredo scenario, urban 
expansion is so dense and consequently new water right acquisitions by exclusion so low 
for urban agents, that urban agents enter the market to purchase water rights required for 
municipal use.  While returns to agricultural production increase as the scenarios assume 
greater urban population density, agricultural sector revenues from land sales and water 
sales decline. 
In the two institutional scenarios, where brackish desalination adoption is 
accelerated, quantities of brackish desalination produced expand until production 
capacity reaches the resource’s physical limit.  In the SB3 scenario, a reduced price on 
excluded water rights is imposed.  This reduces water sales revenues to the agricultural 
sector and reduces the opportunity costs of water treatment in the municipal sector.  
Lower treatment costs result in an increase in urban water consumer surplus, but do not 
shift urban supply sources away from brackish groundwater desalination. 
The climate change scenarios impose on the model climate-based crop effects 
and system-wide reductions in reservoir inflows.  If climate change substantially reduces 
the average inflows to the reservoirs serving the region, seawater desalination may 
127 
 
 
optimally constitute a small component of regional water supplies.  These results hold 
given certain highly-profitable irrigated crops maintain and/or increase in profitability 
under climate change.  Of the five climate change models used in this analysis, only one 
is associated with significant gains to the agricultural sector.  If climate change 
substantially reduces reservoir inflows, then the agricultural sector is likely to face losses 
in production and economic benefits. 
One of the broad goals of the model presented in this essay is to generate useful 
information to water resource planners and managers in the Valley.  One broad issue that 
follows from the population density scenarios is the degree to which regional water-use 
planning groups communicate with their counterparts in regional land-use planning 
groups.  This essay demonstrates that land-use changes, in particular the expansion of 
urban areas into previously agricultural land, have dramatic effects on production returns 
to the agricultural sector as well as on water and land sales revenues to the agricultural 
sector.  Therefore, one policy implication following from this finding is that such groups 
(i.e., land and water planning groups) may benefit from greater communication and, to 
some degree, conjoint management of their legally-bound resources.   
Another policy recommendation includes a suggestion that the groundwater 
resources of the Valley be more explicitly understood and incorporated into regional 
water planning.  From this essay, the cost-competitiveness of brackish groundwater 
desalination is likely to induce a greater portion of future municipal water supplies 
coming from brackish groundwater.  From the second essay of this dissertation, the 
hydrologic relationship between the River and the region’s aquifer has not been recently 
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studied, especially in light of increasing groundwater pumping for brackish groundwater 
desalination activities.  Since the aquifer is likely to be a continuing, if not a growing, 
source of water for the region, understanding the capacity of that resource will become 
more important in the coming decades.  Many policy options are available to manage 
such a resource, such as imposing pumping limits for groundwater users (which is 
essentially modeled in this essay) and installing a system of property rights (such as 
those used to manage surface water in the region). 
A final broad issue underscored by this essay is the importance of anticipating 
and preparing for climate change.  Four out of five climate change scenarios discussed 
are associated with less prosperity for the agricultural sector, with greater losses in 
productivity as reservoir inflow levels decline.  A final issue is the importance of 
technology adoption in the portfolio of municipal water supplies.  Brackish groundwater 
desalination can provide a substitute to singular dependence on the River, whose flows 
may become less reliable and less sizable over the next 50 years.  For this reason, the 
most expensive municipal water supply alternative, seawater desalination, enters the 
model’s optimal portfolio of municipal supplies under a climate change scenario with a 
0.35 reduction in River system inflows.  
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The focus of this dissertation is water issues in the Texas Lower Rio Grande 
Valley, geographically the region of south Texas near the mouth of the Rio Grande.  The 
common threads across the three essays presented include the impact and relationship 
between water resource institutions and the well-being of the Valley community.  A few 
of the institutions at work across the region include: a functioning water market, 
governmental and regulatory agencies, and water suppliers to both municipal consumers 
and agricultural producers.  The challenges to the Valley water management system are 
abundant.  The region is relatively economically-poor compared to the United States and 
is experiencing rapid population growth in the urban sector.  Increasing population levels 
in the urban sector drive greater municipal water demand, which brings out equity 
concerns between the growing municipal sector and the longstanding agricultural sector.  
Additional equity concerns exist within the municipal sector, where newly-formed 
immigrant communities do not have access to water and wastewater services that are 
assumed to be standard across much of the United States.   
Another issue that is likely to impact and test the region’s water management 
institutions is the need for future water planning considering both the rapidly-increasing 
population and the potential of global climate change to permanently alter the reliable 
yields of the region’s natural water sources. These topics are addressed through a 
theoretical study of water and health inter-relationships, a conceptual study of water 
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management institutions, and a computational evaluation of present and future water 
supplies for regional well-being.  The underlying motivation for the selection of these 
topics is a strong interest in the inter-relationships between water resources, public 
health, and economic well-being.   
The first essay highlights water and public health-related issues of the Valley.  A 
theoretical model of water-related disease management is developed.  The essay 
discusses an empirical case study that is based on Hidalgo County, Texas.  The results 
from this study underscore the importance of capital depreciation, institutional design, 
and how the two are linked by a water manager’s planning horizon.  Greater capital 
depreciation rates and shorter planning horizons are shown to be associated with lower 
community welfare.  When these two undesirable forces combine, even less desirable 
consequences for the community are produced.  More desirable water and public health 
management objectives can be achieved by either extending the planning horizon of the 
manager and/or by investing in long-lasting, relatively-durable capital in municipal 
water supply systems. 
Implications from the first essay are that a public health accounting stance is 
important.  Public health managers with a relatively narrow scope, such as those working 
exclusively with colonia residents, perceive a greater proportion of infected individuals 
than, for example, state-level public administrators.  From the results of the control 
model, perceiving a greater portion of infected is expected to inflate the perceived 
marginal net benefits to therapeutic disease management strategies, such as medical 
treatment, relative to preventative measures, such as water treatment. Another finding 
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from essay 1 is that greater capital depreciation rates and shorter time horizons are 
shown to be associated with lower community welfare.  Scenarios with shorter planning 
horizons invested less in centralized-municipal stock.  Lower capital depreciation rates 
allow the community to benefit from more durable centralized-municipal stocks, which 
prevents new infections and reduces disease damages. 
The second essay is a largely, qualitative evaluation of the performance of the 
region’s water market.  This water market is shown to effectively reallocate water 
resources from low-valued agricultural use to higher-valued municipal and urban use.  
As the region’s population growth and urban expansion has progressed over the last few 
decades, the price of a water right in the water market has risen to reflect the rising 
scarcity of water and change in structure of the region.  These are encouraging signs that 
the market is operating to the benefit of society as a whole.  As the region anticipates 
large population growth and potentially significant changes to physical water availability 
due to potential climate change, complications may arise that pose a concern for the 
functionality of the water market and pose a challenge for regional water managers.  
More specific findings from the water market study include that the real price of 
a Falcon-Amistad water right has approximately doubled since the mid-1990s.  During 
approximately the same period across the region, the numbers of agricultural water 
rights have fallen and the numbers of DMI water rights have increased.  The major 
purchasers of water rights were individuals (33%) and municipal water suppliers (55%).  
Major water rights sellers included individuals (68%) and irrigation districts (30%).  
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Overall, municipal water suppliers were the only net purchasers of water rights, with 
individuals and irrigation districts being net sellers. 
The final essay addresses a few of the potential challenges raised in the second 
essay by constructing and implementing a hydroeconomic model for the region.  The 
model represents water resource management for a three-county region in south Texas 
that includes Cameron, Hidalgo, and Willacy counties.  The model is calibrated to 
resemble documented behavior in 2010 and then the model is solved under a variety of 
scenarios representing the year 2060.  Model year 2060 scenarios include several 
assumptions about land-use changes from agriculture to urban with population growth, 
water-related institutions, and climate change.  In particular, the results from the 
hydroeconomic model highlight the importance of population density, land-use change 
policy, and technology adoption.  Land-use and water-use institutions in the region are 
explicitly linked, through excludable water rights transactions.  As such, coordinated 
management of water and land resources may be an advisable course of action in the 
future.  The adoption of innovative technologies is expected to play a larger role in the 
region’s municipal water supply system, particularly in the case of climate change, 
which may result in significant reductions to inflows into the region’s reservoir system. 
In particular, the 2060 scenario results indicate that greater population density, 
which reduces the amount of land converted from agricultural-use to urban-use, leaves 
more agricultural land in production and so increases the agricultural sector’s returns to 
production.  However, this increase in production returns comes at the cost of reduced 
revenues from the sale of land and water rights.  In the scenario with the most dense 
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assumption about the density of new population growth, the municipal sector could not 
attain sufficient water rights by the exclusion process and therefore entered the open 
market to purchase additional water rights from the agricultural sector.  According to the 
2060 scenarios, climate change may have a profound effect on the region’s water 
supplies and water-related economic activity.  Assuming climate change brings a 0.35 
reduction in reservoir system inflows, seawater desalination may constitute a small 
portion of the region’s municipal water supplies.  In only one General Circulation Model 
scenario, do the climate change effects on crop yields and water use result in a 
prosperous estimate of 2060 agricultural production.  In the other General Circulation 
Model scenarios, returns to agricultural production declined.  In all scenarios, 
agricultural production falls dramatically as greater reductions on reservoir inflows are 
imposed.  As a final word of caution, all of the 2060 results constitute long-term 
predictions conditional on an array of assumptions and, therefore, any interpretation of 
the 2060 results should be limited.  Overgeneralizations or unqualified interpretations of 
those results would not be prudent.   
Overall, this dissertation examines several characteristics of a region with 
challenging and looming water-resource planning and management issues.  The ability 
for regional water managers to address these issues may depend on their understanding 
of the nexus of institutions and environmental conditions that affect water resource 
planning and management.  Institutions may be challenged by changing demographics 
and changing climate; and emerging demographic and climatic realities may drive the 
adoption of new institutions.   
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Several important issues are likely to face the region in coming decades, such as 
finding water supplies for an urban population that is expected to double in the next 50 
years.  Many of these new residents are likely to be immigrants from Mexico with 
limited means to support municipal water infrastructure investment.  The degree to 
which and the means by which these new residents receive municipal water, wastewater, 
and sanitation services are likely to continue to be issues of importance.  Finally, if new 
municipal water supplies are to be reallocated from the agricultural sector, by either the 
process of exclusion or the open market, then the effect on the agricultural community 
requires additional study and understanding.  This is true especially in the light of 
climate change, which may reduce water supplies but may also adjust the profitability of 
crops in south Texas. 
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APPENDIX A  
THE DISCRETE VERSION OF THE CONTROL PROBLEM 
 
This discrete version of the optimal control problem presented in equations 
(A.1-7) was used to generate the numerical results. 
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APPENDIX B  
DETAILS ON THE PARAMETERIZATION OF THE NUMERICAL ANALYSIS 
 
The numerical results come from a parameterized version of the discrete model.  
Numerical values for the parameters are displayed in Table B-1.  The sources of these 
values come from literature sources and from reasonable approximations, in many cases 
derived from literature sources.  The sources of individual parameter values are 
discussed below in greater detail. 
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Table B-1.  Baseline parameter values for numerical solution of public health 
manager's water-services and waterborne disease optimization model for the case 
of Hidalgo County, Texas. 
Parameters 
Model 
Notation Values 
Population birth rate a 0.02 
Population death rate b 0.02 
Spontaneous transmission rate βs 0.462 
CM transmission rate βcm 0.11 
POU transmission rate βpou 0.11 
Spontaneous recovery rate δs 0.786 
Medically-enhanced recovery rate δm 1 
Initial Infected Level It=0 0.15 
Initial CM Level Acmt=0 0.96 
CM cost factor Ccm 1 
POU cost factor ($10 Million) Cpou 3.874 
Medical cost factor ($10 Million) Cm 3.990 
Capital depreciation rate  γ 0.1 
Manager's budget ($10 Million) Et 0.5 
Social time preference rate r 0.06 
Morbidity damage factor kI 1 
Total Population Level   424,762 
Medical cost per person ($)   93.79 
POU cost per person ($)   91.2 
Source(s): WHO and UNICEF (1998); Jones (1999); Kommineni et al. (no date); 
Sargent-Michaud et al. (2006); Miguel and Gugerty (2005); Reynolds (2000); U.S. 
Census Bureau (2011b); Reynolds et al. (2008); Messner et al. (2006); Imhoff et al. 
(2004); Moe et al. (1991); Snyder and Merson (1982). 
Medical Services Costs (cMed) 
Assuming the medical treatment occurs at a community clinic and the treatment 
is the relatively inexpensive Oral Rehydration Salts (between $0.06 - $0.10 per dose at 
an average of two doses per case) (WHO and UNICEF 1998), the largest component of 
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medical costs to the public health system is the time and productivity opportunity costs 
of the patient and the medical staff.  This combined charge is approximated as wages for 
a single day for the patient ($7.25/hour * 8 hours = $58.00) and wages for one half hour 
for the medical staff, consisting of a general practitioner (0.5* $50.04/hr  = $25.02/case) 
and a registered nurse (0.5 * $21.38/hour = $10.69/case) (Jones 1999).  The sum of these 
costs yields a total medical cost of ($58.00 + $25.02 + $10.69) $93.79 per case.   
The per case cost times the populations of interest in Hidalgo County (424,762 in 
2010), Hidalgo County colonias (114,284 in 2007), and Hidalgo County “Red” Colonias 
(17,253 in 2007) is equal to: $39,838,428 for Hidalgo County, $10,718,697 for all 
Hidalgo County colonias, and $1,618,159 for residents in Hidalgo County “Red” 
colonias.  Medical payments of this magnitude for a single county are unrealistic, but 
these amounts reflect the cost of providing everyone in Hidalgo County with medical 
treatment for diarrheal disease were they all to be infected.  Since at one time only a 
fraction of total residents are infected, full medical coverage would cost a fraction of the 
amounts listed above.  For the numerical portion of this study, the value for all of 
Hidalgo county is set equal to Cm, which, during optimization, is then multiplied by aMed, 
the portion of the total population that actually receives treatment. 
Point-Of-Use Costs (cPOU) 
The per household cost of providing POU services is estimated by considering 
the costs to install and operate an in-home water filtration systems for a year.  
Kommineni et al. (no date) report monthly costs for POU reverse osmosis systems at 
$50/month and POU adsorption systems at $38/month.  This is equal to an annual cost of 
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$600/year for RO and $456/year for adsorption.  These values are likely to exceed the 
costs for the health issues studied in this paper because the Kommineni et al. values also 
include an annual arsenic test of $15/year.  These annual costs from Kommineni et al. 
are relatively close to annual costs for similar treatment processes reported by Sargent-
Michaud et al. (2006). 
Multiplying the annual POU household costs by the number of households in 
Hidalgo County, which is taken to be total population divided by an assumed average 
household size of five individuals (424,762 / 5 = 84,952 households), yields the total 
cost of distributing POU to the entirety of Hidalgo County, which is found in the range 
of $38,738,294  (84,952 households * $456/yr) on the low end and $50,971,200 (84,952 
households * $600/yr) on the high end. 
Initial Centralized-municipal Service Level ( ) 
To approximate the initial level of centralized-municipal water services, this 
study identifies the number of reported colonia residents that were reported to have no 
access to either potable water or wastewater disposal, which is 17,253 individuals in 
Hidalgo County (USGS 2010b), approximately 15% of the county’s colonia population 
and about 4% of the county’s total population.  Note, while this number of individuals is 
the number counted in 2007 and since then many such households may have acquired 
drinking water or wastewater services, it nonetheless represents the best available 
information on the subject.  Therefore the initial level of Acm is set equal to 96% (i.e., 
	

=0.96). 
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Centralized-municipal Costs and Depreciation 
Cost structuring the stock of CM infrastructure is more complicated than the 
either of the other two disease management strategies.  This involves taking equation 2.8 
and imposing 	 = 0, and rearranging to yield the following relation: 

 = 	
.  This 
relation (and its assumptions) captures the idea that in a community with no existent CM 
stock, all expenditures on CM are weighted by ccm to yield the corresponding amount of 
CM infrastructure that will be available in the next period.  A reasonable value to use for 
ccm is not known.  A value of  = 4 suggests that in a given year, the community can 
go from 0% of the population having CM services to 25% having CM services by 
expending all of the disease management budget available to a community on CM.  A 
quarter of the population of a community the size of Hidalgo County is more than 
100,000 individuals.   
An estimate for the value of the annual capital depreciation rate is similarly 
difficult to identify.  Miguel and Gugerty (2005) report that in western Kenya nearly 50 
percent of borehole wells dug in the 1980s, and subsequently maintained using a 
community-based maintenance model, had fallen into disrepair by 2000.  This decay 
level, 50% lost in a period of 20 years corresponds to an annual decay rate of about 
0.035.  Such a rate is likely too high for a more economically developed location 
characteristic of Hidalgo County   For robustness, several depreciation rates will be used 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, and the resulting system characteristics explored.   
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Recovery Rates 
There are two recovery rates associated with the model, coming from the 
recovery function:  =  −  + .  The medically-enhanced recovery 
rate is assumed to be  = 1, which implies that all individuals included in the portion 
of the receiving medical care move to the susceptible class the next time period.  
Intuitively, medication results in a full and complete recovery.   
Morbidity danger associated with waterborne illnesses is different depending on 
a population’s level of young, old, and otherwise immune-compromised individuals 
(Reynolds 2000).  Estimation of a value for the spontaneous recovery rate  begins 
with considering the infected population as being composed of immune-compromised 
and immune-sufficient individuals.  The immune-compromised individuals are defined 
as being children under the age of five and adults over the age of 65.  In Hidalgo County, 
these individuals make up, respectively, 9.5% and 11.9%, of the population (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2011b).  This suggests that if a randomly selected person in Hidalgo County gets 
a diarrheal disease 21.4% of the time that person will be immune-compromised and the 
other 78.6% of the time that person will be a relatively healthier adult.  By this 
reasoning, the spontaneous recovery is set as:  = 0.786.  Intuitively, this rate implies 
that as individuals get infected and do not receive medical care, those individuals are 
moved back into the susceptible class (i.e., they recover) at a rate equal to the portion of 
the healthy adult population.  By this assumption, healthy adults recover in one time 
period and the immune-compromised portion of the infected lingers in the infected class 
for at least one more time period. 
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Transmission Rates 
The transmission rates for diarrheal illness with access to treated drinking water 
comes from the review by Reynolds et al. (2008), who, citing Messner et al. (2006) and 
Imhoff et al. (2004),  summarize that gastrointestinal illness prevalence that is 
attributable to drinking water is equal to 0.11 cases/person/year.  Since no distinction in 
those studies is made with respect to drinking water treatment technologies, this essay 
assumes both technologies have equal effectiveness as devices to prevent diarrheal 
episodes:  =  ! = 0.11.  A limitation of this study is that the model, and 
specifically, this transmission rate, abstracts away from other sources of diarrheal illness, 
which can occur through infection routes that may be unrelated to water quality (Moe et 
al. 1991). 
In one of the earlier world-wide surveys of diarrheal disease burden studies, 
Snyder and Merson (1982) report that the average number of episodes for individuals in 
Asia and Latin America were, respectively 2.013 and 1.075 per person per year, with 
increasing episodes with the youngest age groups.  During the 1960s and 1970s, when 
these studies were conducted, water service coverage in those regions was likely 
minimal.  So, arguably, these values provide a reasonable proxy for a baseline 
transmission rate that might occur in the absence of water treatment.  The worldwide 
episode rates for individuals younger than (older than) five years are 1.91 (0.27) 
cases/person/year.  By weighting these two rates by the demographic percentages for 
Hidalgo County found in U.S. Census Bureau (2011), the total estimated population 
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transmission rate for population portions with no water treatment of any kind is assumed 
to be  = 0.462. 
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APPENDIX C  
DESCRIPTION OF NUMERICAL COMPUTATION 
 
The numeric computation procedure follows a fairly standardized formula for 
genetic algorithm computation (Forrest 1993; Holland 1992).  At the beginning of the 
program, several thousand candidate solutions are randomly generated.  The objective 
function values of each candidate solution are reviewed and the best solution is recorded.  
For this study, “best” is equivalent to “greatest”, since the objective is to maximize 
∑ −1 +  .  Next, for each of the candidate solutions, the value of a single 
control variable is changed slightly.  Once again the program is designed to review the 
objective function values of the candidate solutions and record the best solution from the 
new generation.  This process is repeated for several thousand generations of solutions.  
The best solution from each new generation is compared to the best solution from all 
previous generations.  The program terminates at the end of a specified maximum 
number of generations and then outputs the best solution.  The following pseudo-code 
describes the program more succinctly: 
1. Initialize the population of solutions 
2. Evaluate the objective function values of each solution 
3. Record the best solution in the generation 
4. Generate a new set of solutions from the previous, or parent, generation 
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5. Check that each new solution is located in feasible solution space and if the 
solution is not feasible, then move the solution to the nearest feasible 
solution. 
6. Record the best solution in the generation 
7. Compare current generation best solution to previous generation best 
8. If maximum number of generations has been reached, then terminate; if not, 
return to step 4. 
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APPENDIX D  
BUDGET CONSTRAINT SENSITIVITY TABLES 
Table D-1. Baseline results from the public health manager’s disease 
management problem for the case of Hidalgo County, Texas, using the baseline 
budget level (Et = 0.5).a 
Time: 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Controlsb.             
x
CM
 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 
aPOU 0.04 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.13 
aM 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
State Variables             
Infected 0.15 0.09 0.10 0.17 0.16 0.12 
Centralized-municipal 0.96 0.86 0.78 0.81 0.82 0.74 
  
Budget shares             
Centralized-municipal 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Point-of-use 0.31 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Medical 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
Water Services             
Centralized-municipal 0.96 0.86 0.78 0.81 0.82 0.74 
Point-of-use 0.04 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.13 
None 0.00 0.01 0.22 0.19 0.05 0.13 
  
Medical Services             
Portion of Total Population 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Portion of Infected 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
Cumulative Damagesc. 0.15 0.23 0.32 0.47 0.59 0.68 
a.
  Et = 0.5 refers to a budget size that is equal to the baseline. 
b.
  x
CM
 are the expenditures on centralized-municipal water services.  aPOU is the portion 
of population receiving point-of-use water services.  aM is the portion of the infected 
population receiving medical treatment. 
c.
  Cumulative damages are measured as  −1"

 .  
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Table D-2.  Sensitivity results from the public health manager’s disease 
management problem for the case of Hidalgo County, Texas, using a budget level 
reduced from the baseline to 50% (Et = 0.25).a. 
Time: 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Controlsb.             
x
CM
 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.00 
aPOU 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06 
aM 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
State Variables             
Infected 0.15 0.10 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.16 
Centralized-municipal 0.96 0.86 0.81 0.78 0.76 0.68 
  
Budget shares             
Centralized-municipal 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Point-of-use 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Medical 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
Water Services             
Centralized-municipal 0.96 0.86 0.81 0.78 0.76 0.68 
Point-of-use 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06 
None 0.00 0.14 0.19 0.22 0.18 0.26 
  
Medical Services             
Portion of Total Population 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Portion of Infected 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
  
     Cumulative Damagesc. 0.15 0.24 0.37 0.51 0.64 0.76 
a.
  Et = 0.25 refers to a budget size that is one quarter of the baseline. 
b.
  x
CM
 are the expenditures on centralized-municipal water services.  aPOU is the portion 
of population receiving point-of-use water services.  aM is the portion of the infected 
population receiving medical treatment. 
c.
  Cumulative damages are measured as  −1"

 .  
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Table D-3. Sensitivity results from the public health manager’s disease 
management problem for the case of Hidalgo County, Texas, using a budget level 
increased from the baseline by 100% (Et = 1.0).a. 
Time: 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Controlsb.             
x
CM
 0.25 0.51 0.42 0.34 0.09 0.00 
aPOU 0.04 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.26 
aM 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 
  
State Variables             
Infected 0.15 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 
Centralized-municipal 0.96 0.87 0.85 0.83 0.80 0.74 
  
Budget shares             
Centralized-municipal 0.25 0.51 0.42 0.34 0.09 0.00 
Point-of-use 0.15 0.49 0.58 0.66 0.76 1.00 
Medical 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 
  
Water Services             
Centralized-municipal 0.96 0.87 0.85 0.83 0.80 0.74 
Point-of-use 0.04 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.26 
None 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
Medical Services             
Portion of Total Population 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 
Portion of Infected 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.00 
 
  
     Cumulative Damagesc. 0.15 0.22 0.31 0.39 0.47 0.54 
a.
  Et = 0.25 refers to a budget size that is one quarter of the baseline. 
b.
  x
CM
 are the expenditures on centralized-municipal water services.  aPOU is the portion 
of population receiving point-of-use water services.  aM is the portion of the infected 
population receiving medical treatment. 
c.
  Cumulative damages are measured as  −1"

 . 
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APPENDIX E 
DETAILS ON PRICE TREND REGRESSION 
 
The regression results supporting the models presented in Figure 2-6 are 
displayed in Table E-1.  Table E-1 contains estimated values for coefficients, p-values 
for estimates, measures of explanatory power (i.e., R2 and Adjusted R2), and the F-test 
values for the models.  These models were selected because, visually, prices in the 
market appear to be relatively constant during the years 1983 to approximately 1998, 
Table E-1.   Regression analyses on real market prices for water rights in the 
Falcon-Amistad water market, 2009. 
Model 
Name Model Formulaa,b,c Coefficient valuesd 
Model statistics 
R2 
Adj-
R2 F-test e 
Liebig p = b0*D1+ b1*D2 + b2*t*D2 
b0 b1 b2 
0.873 0.859 64.99 0.698 -1.73 0.157 
0.000 0.003 0.000 
Linear 
Dummy 
p = b3 + b4*t + 
b5*t*D3 
b3 b4 b5 
0.892 0.880 78.08 0.675 0.003 0.042 
0.000 0.778 0.000 
                
Source(s): analyses of nominal prices reported in Caroom and Maxwell (2005); Chang 
and Griffin (1992); Characklis et al. (1999); Griffin and Characklis (2002); Levine 
(2007); NRS Consulting Engineers (2001, 2003, 2006); Schoolmaster (1991). 
a
 y is the time-adjusted real market price, using a 2% inflation rate and 2008 as the base 
year. 
b
 t is years in the sample, with year 1 starting at 1983. 
c
 D1, D2, D3 are a dummy variables for, respectively, the years 1983-1991, 1999-2005, 
and 2000-2005. 
d
 P-values are listed below coefficient estimates with p-values in bold corresponding to 
coefficient estimates that have a level of significance of 5% or less. 
e F-test values in bold correspond to a level of significance of 5% or less. 
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and thereafter prices appear to be increasing.  The formal description of the Liebig 
model presented in Figure 2-6 is presented in equation E-1, below: 
  ̂ = max , + #,       (E.1) 
where the predicted price trend (i.e., ̂ and/or the dashed line in Figure 2-6) is a function 
of the maximum value of either the constant price trend in the early years of the sample 
(i.e., ), or the increasing price trend in the latter portion of the sample (i.e.,  + #). 
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APPENDIX F  
DEMAND CURVE PROJECTION 
 
The consumer surplus values for municipal water consumption were projected by 
assuming a linear demand form (Nicholson and Snyder 2008), as follows: 
  = m + ,         (F.1) 
where  is the quantity of water consumed, m (equal to  ⁄ ) is the slope of the 
demand curve,  is the price of water, and  is a constant.  The inverse demand equation 
is found by inverting equation F.1 to yield: 
 = w− m.        (F.2) 
Equation 4A.2 is the demand equation included in the objective function as 
$∙.  Integration over w results in the equation for consumer surplus (i.e., ) that is 
used to compute the consumer surplus component of the objective function value: 
 =  w− m = 0.5
#m −m.   (F.3) 
To compute this value, the following parameters must be identified or assumed: 
,,	and .  The quantity of water, , is calculated in the model.  By substituting in a 
single data point for quantity and price and invoking an estimated price elasticity from 
literature, the slope of the demand curve, , can be calculated.  The formula for price 
elasticity is (Nicholson and Snyder 2008): 
 = %&%

&.         (F.4) 
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Replacing  with , and rearranging results in the following estimate for the slope of the 
demand curve: 
 = %% = 

 .        (F.5) 
Once the value for  is calculated from assumed values of elasticity, water 
quantity, and price, the constant term, , can be calculated by solving the linear demand 
form for  (using the same assumed single data point for quantity and price): 
 =  −.         (F.6) 
This study averaged over monthly price elasticities reported in Bell and Griffin 
(2006) to generate seasonal price elasticities.  Water quantities by season and county are 
calculated from unpublished county-level diversion data collected by the Watermaster’s 
office in Harlingen.  The price of municipal water is assumed to be $679/acre foot (or 
$20.67/1,000 gallons).  This price is selected as a relatively-low, conservative value 
based on a recent survey of water rates (Ohio EPA 2010).  A demand curve is calculated 
for each county and each season. 
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APPENDIX G  
RELEVANT DATA FROM VALLEY CROP BUDGETS  
 
Crop budgets developed by AgriLife Extension (Extension Agricultural 
Economics 2011) were used to advise the selection of crops to include in the agricultural 
component of the model.  In most cases, parameter values for yield, prices, and 
production costs were taken directly from crop budgets.  Those values are listed in 
Table G-1. 
Table G-1. Crop prices, yields per acre, and costs per acre used in the model of a 
three-county region (Cameron, Hidalgo, Willacy counties) in south Texas. 
crop (i) practice (p) Price ($) Yield (per acre) Cost ($/acre) 
cotton dryland 0.81 596.17 lbsa 416 
cotton irrigated 0.81 997.64 lbsa 609 
sorghum dryland 8.50 22.00 cwt 159 
sorghum irrigated 8.50 43.00 cwt 207 
corn irrigated 4.90 100.00 bu 285 
sugar cane irrigated 19.00 50.00 tons 803 
onion irrigated 12.00 550.00 sacks 3,374 
cantaloupe irrigated 10.00 600.00 crtn 4,581 
cabbage irrigated 8.00 930.00 crtn 3,501 
citrus irrigated 100.00 23.00 tons 1,066 
Source(s): Extension Agricultural Economics (2011). 
a.
 According to the crop budgets, cotton crops produce two marketable items, lint and 
seed.  For this model, seed revenues are converted into “lint-yield equivalent”. These 
lint-yield equivalents were then added to the crop budget’s documented lint yields to 
produce the values reported in the table. 
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APPENDIX H  
CROP WATER CONSUMPTION TABLES 
 
Estimates for water application by crop using the irrigation values reported in the 
Valley’s crop budgets.  Following consultations with local crop scientists, the crop 
budget water use values were modified and the following table of crop water use values 
is applied in the model (Table H-1). 
Table H-1. Selected crop water usages (acre feet) in the Texas Lower Rio Grande 
Valley for one acre of a given crop adjusted from crop budget data, 2011. 
  Season   
  Spring Summer Fall Winter Annual 
Cotton (irrigated) 0.76 0.96 1.72 
Cotton (dryland) 
Sorghum (irrigated 1.08 0.36 1.44 
Sorghum (dryland) 
Cabbage 0.18 0.66 0.45 1.29 
Sugarcane 1.17 2.33 0.94 0.35 4.79 
Citrus 0.84 1.18 0.75 0.42 3.19 
Cantaloupe 0.80 0.40 1.20 
Onion 0.15 0.55 0.37 1.07 
Corn 0.69 1.16 1.85 
Source(s): Crosby (2011); Extension Agricultural Economics (2011); Jifon (2011); Koo 
(1975); Texas Board of Water Engineers (1960); Wiedenfield et al. (2004). 
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APPENDIX I  
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM COSTS 
 
The calculations used to estimate the cost of municipal water service distribution 
is presented in Table I-1.  The assumptions are based on a municipal water distribution 
expansion project for a water supplier located in Hidalgo County (Correa 2011).  The 
piping details are related to the water suppliers’ current distribution size.  The pumping 
details are based on a possible expansion of the system.  The estimated costs are 
$26/year/person served, or $91/year/acre foot delivered (Correa 2011).  
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Table I-1. Assumptions and calculations used to generate a per unit cost 
($/year/acre foot) of municipal water distribution (i.e., without treatment) for a 
modeled three-county region (Cameron, Hidalgo, and Willacy counties) in Texas. 
Piping details   
System capacity (gallons per day) 16,000,000 
System capacity (acre feet per year) 17,922 
Approximate service size (population served) 64,144 
Piping ($) 20,932,636 
Amortization period (years) 50 
Discount rate (rate) 0.06125 
Annualized piping cost ($/year) 1,351,285 
Annualized piping cost ($/year/acre foot) 75.40 
  
Pumping details   
System capacity (gallons per day) 8,000,000 
System capacity (acre feet per year) 8,961 
Approximate service size (population served) 36,697 
Pumps ($) 519,000 
Pump installation and housing  ($) 389,250 
Piping, controls, valving, apperturances  ($) 1,197,000 
Pumping capital subtotal ($) 2,105,250 
Amortization period (years) 50 
Discount rate (rate) 0.06125 
Annualized pumping cost ($/year) 135,902 
Annualized pumping cost ($/year/acre foot) 15.17 
  
Continuing cost details   
Operations and maintenance ($/year) 48,180 
Annualized continued costs ($/year/acre foot) 0.04 
  
Cost summary   
Annual costs per capita served ($/year/person) 26.08 
Annual cost per acre foot delivered ($/year/acre 
foot) 90.60 
Source(s): Correa (2011) and user defined.  
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APPENDIX J  
IRRIGATION AND DRYLAND EXPANSION COSTS 
Table J-1. Estimated costs of land-use changes, conversion of dryland 
agriculture to irrigated agriculture and conversion of ranchland/wilderness to 
cropland for a modeled three-county region (Cameron, Hidalgo, and Willacy 
counties) in Texas. 
Irrigation Expansion Cost   
Estimated irrigation infrastructure cost/mile   $4,200,000  
Agricultural acres per mile             242  
Cost per acre        $17,355  
Amortization period (years)               50  
Discount factor 0.06125 
Annualized cost ($/acre/year)     $1,120.36  
  
Dryland Expansion Cost   
Estimated dryland expansion cost/acre          $1,000  
Amortization period (years)               50  
Discount factor 0.06125 
Annualized cost ($/acre/year)          $64.55  
Source(s): Correa (2011) and user defined. 
Some of the key assumptions used in the calculation of the per mile cost of 
irrigation infrastructure are as follows (Correa 2011) (Figure J-1): canal size and flow 
capacity are based on 10,000 acre delivery area, servicing summer-season sugar cane 
production, where water deliveries occur during 24 days in the three-month summer 
season.  These assumptions reflect the greatest plausible volume of water to be conveyed 
through an irrigation canal and imply a rate of 0.05 cubic feet per second per acre.  
Restricting maximum flow velocity through the canal to be less than two feet per second, 
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the physical design parameters are calculated for an earthen canal that is 120.6 feet wide 
at the base and 52.2 feet wide at the top, with 22.2 feet of water surface and two 12-feet 
wide, drivable embankments on either side of the water surface.  The canal is 17.1 feet 
tall, with the bottom of the water channel located three feet above natural ground and the 
top of the embankments located three feet above the designed water surface.  The 
assumed price of earthen fill (delivery, manipulation, and compaction) is $12.40 per 
cubic yard (Correa 2011).  The canal is also assumed to be equipped with a 4-inch thick 
concrete liner, with an assumed, in-place cost of $450 per cubic yard (Correa 2011).
  
 
Figure J-1. Cross-sectional view of hypothetical canal used to calculate the cost of expanding irrigation 
infrastructure to dryland agricultural areas for a modeled three-county region (Cameron, Hidalgo, and Willacy 
counties) in Texas. 
Source(s): Correa (2011).    174
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APPENDIX K  
CROP EFFECTS BY GLOBAL CIRCULATION MODEL 
 
Following Beach et al. (2009), climate forecasts from the GCMs are used as 
inputs into Environmental Policy Integrated Climate models (EPICs), which output 
changes in yields and water consumption for several crops in south Texas (cotton, corn, 
soybeans, soft red winter wheat, hard red winter wheat, durum wheat, hard red spring 
wheat, sorghum, rice, oats, barley, silage, hay, sugar cane, sugar beets, potatoes, 
tomatoes, energy sorghum, sweet sorghum, oranges, grapefruits, grazing oats, grazing 
wheat).  For several crops included in the hydroeconomic model of the Valley discussed 
herein, crop response data are unavailable; those crops include onion, cabbage, and 
cantaloupe.  For this study, the crop response effects of sugar beets are assumed to be a 
proxy for missing effects for onion.  Tomatoes are assumed to be the proxy for cabbage 
and cantaloupe.  The climate effects on crop water use and crop yield are presented in 
Table K-1. 
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Table K-1. Proportional changes in crop yields and crop water use for the south 
Texas region from several General Circulation Models (GCMs) used to generate 
climate change scenarios in the a modeled three-county region (Cameron, Hidalgo, 
and Willacy counties) in Texas in model year 2060. 
Global Circulation Model (GCM) 
crop (i) practice (p) 
crop 
attribute 
CGCM 
3.1 
MRI-
CGCM2.2 
GFDL-
CM2.0 
GFDL-
CM2.1 Avg 
Cotton dryland yield 0.13 -0.30 -0.42 -0.62 -0.30 
cotton irrigated yield 0.00 -0.12 -0.03 0.44 0.07 
cotton irrigated water use -0.07 0.44 -0.09 0.30 0.14 
        
sorghum dryland yield -0.02 -0.10 -0.11 -0.39 -0.15 
sorghum irrigated water use -0.05 -0.28 -0.02 0.41 0.01 
sorghum irrigated yield -0.07 0.23 -0.15 0.43 0.11 
        
corn irrigated yield -0.09 -0.57 -0.03 0.41 -0.07 
corn irrigated water use -0.04 0.17 -0.18 0.66 0.15 
        
sugar cane irrigated yield -0.02 0.58 -0.07 0.73 0.30 
sugar cane irrigated water use -0.05 0.52 -0.09 0.60 0.24 
        
onion irrigated yield 0.08 1.00 0.17 0.07 0.33 
onion irrigated water use -0.03 -0.62 0.19 -0.58 -0.26 
        
cantaloupe irrigated yield -0.09 -0.57 -0.03 0.41 -0.07 
cantaloupe irrigated water use -0.04 0.17 -0.18 0.66 0.15 
        
cabbage irrigated yield -0.09 -0.57 -0.03 0.41 -0.07 
cabbage irrigated water use -0.04 0.17 -0.18 0.66 0.15 
        
citrus irrigated yield -0.33 -0.61 -0.02 0.36 -0.15 
citrus irrigated water use -0.24 0.22 -0.60 0.52 -0.02 
Source(s): Modified from Beach et al. (2009). 
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